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Abstract 
In light of the negative reputation of mortgage backed securities (MBS) due to the subprime 
crisis and considering the swift recovery of the US real estate market since the crisis, the role 
of MBS in a mean-variance optimized portfolio is assessed. Excellent diversification benefits 
as well as attractive risk/ return attributes of agency- MBS are discovered leading to 
persistently biased allocations towards agency-MBS in a mixed portfolio with equities, bonds, 
MBS as well as real estate indices and excellent diversification capabilities are revealed in 
mixed portfolios combining agency-MBS with direct real estate investments.  
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1. Introduction 
The Financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 created significant uncertainty about financial investments 
and lead governments to introduce substantial quantitative easing programs to lower inflation and 
provide liquidity in the markets. The resulting low interest rate environment lead to the hunt for 
yields of investors, since traditionally safe assets like treasury bills provided yields barely 
exceeding inflation rates. Alternative investments like commercial real estate benefitted 
tremendously from the low interest rates as the spreads between safe treasury bills and real estate 
investments widened. The debt side of real estate investments could not recover from the crisis as 
quickly and remained notorious for causing the financial crisis. Being true only for the subprime 
segments of the mortgage backed securities (MBS), the substantially larger market for US 
government agency-guaranteed MBS offers securities with higher yields than treasuries at 
comparable risk exposure. These agency-MBS held up well during the crisis and account for around 
a quarter of the US fixed income market in 2017. The current change of the low- interest 
environment in the US, due to reducing of quantitative easing measures and a growing economy, 
may lead to shrinking spreads, which increases demand for inflation protected assets like MBS. 
This fosters the attractiveness of adding mortgage backed securities to a diversified investment 
portfolio as an addition to equities, bonds as well as real estate. For the consideration of assets to a 
mixed portfolio, investors analyze the risk and return attributes as well as the diversification effects 
on the portfolio. A widely used tool for calculating the optimal asset weights of a mixed portfolio, 
is the mean-variance analysis first proposed by Harry M. Markowitz in 1952.   
 
In light of the current market environment and the lack of recent research about MBS allocations 
in mixed investment portfolios, the following research question is formulated. Are mortgage 
backed securities a valid financial instrument in a diversified portfolio, including stocks and bonds 
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as well as conventional real estate investment instruments? The following research hypotheses are 
tested in an empirical framework using quantitative time-series data for the last 18 years from the 
Bloomberg Terminal on ten indices, representing segments of the asset classes equities, treasuries, 
corporate bonds, MBS, structured mortgage securities as well as real estate. This data is analyzed 
in the mean-variance optimization framework in order to identify allocation patterns and assess the 
importance of the individual asset classes in optimized portfolios. First, it is hypothesized, that 
agency-MBS have substantial allocations in mean-variance optimized portfolios due to attractive 
the risk/return attributes. Secondly, it is hypothesized, that the riskier MBS segments have lower 
allocations than agency MBS due to the effects of the financial crisis. Finally, it is hypothesized, 
that allocations to real estate investment vehicles are larger than agency- MBS at higher risk levels, 
due to the strong and persistent recovery since the financial crisis.  
 
This work is structured as follows. The literature review analyzes existing research and provides 
an overview about the mean- variance framework, focusing on theoretical implications of the 
diversification effect and the most important limitations of this concept. In the next section, the 
asset classes available to investors are discussed focusing on equities, conventional fixed income 
instruments like treasury and corporate bonds as well as real estate investment instruments like real 
estate investment trusts and direct real estate. Further detail is provided on the differences between 
direct and indirect real estate. The last part of the literature review is focused on the description of 
securitized mortgage instruments and their role during the financial crisis. The third chapter is 
concerned with data analysis. In the first section, an overview of the market for financial assets is 
provided with a focus on the performance and market characteristics of the securitized mortgage 
market and the real estate market during the last two decades. The next section is the methodology, 
where a theoretical basis is provided for the mean-variance optimization followed by an 
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explanation of the asset allocation model created in Microsoft Excel, used for the mean-variance 
analysis. It follows a description of the ten indices that were retrieved from Bloomberg in order to 
be used for the portfolio optimization. The subsequent section analyses the returns of the previously 
described indices with descriptive statistics as well as a correlation analysis. These measures 
provide the basis for the mean-variance optimization conducted in section 3.4. Multiple portfolio 
optimizations with several scenarios are conducted in order to understand the behavior of mortgage 
backed securities in mean-variance optimized portfolios. The last chapter first discusses and 
interprets the results of the previously conducted optimizations and finishes with a conclusion and 
a discussion of the limitations of this study as well as recommendations for further research.  
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2. Literature Review 
The literature review begins with an analysis of the mean- variance framework followed by an 
examination of financial assets. Subsequently, direct and indirect real estate investments are 
discussed in further detail. The final part of this chapter focuses on a detailed analysis of securitized 
mortgage vehicles and their role during the financial crisis. 
 
2.1. Theory of the Mean-Variance Optimization 
Investors have access to a variety of investment assets to include in their portfolio which may vary 
depending on several key attributes like risk/return characteristics, liquidity and diversification 
potential. Liquidity refers to the effort and speed required to exchange the value of an asset for cash 
(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2014). Diversification plays a significant role for investors as it allows 
for portfolio risk reduction when combining assets that do not have a perfect positive linear 
relationship. The linear relationship between assets is called correlation. Correlations are measured 
by the Pearson correlation coefficient and refer to the degree of co-movement between two assets. 
The coefficient ranges from positive one, indicating a perfect positive correlation, over zero, 
indicating no correlation to negative one, indicating a perfect negative or inverse relation. The 
diversification effect on portfolios will be examined in greater detail in section 3.2.1.  A significant 
part of financial research focuses on the optimal asset selection and asset management of mixed 
portfolios, ranging from equal weighted or risk weighted portfolios to more complex techniques. 
Decisions are “made about when to make any adjustments as a consequence of a changing 
economic environment or requirements, decisions that are often complicated by consideration of 
taxes and costs” (Shipway, 2009). A famous asset selection technique is the is the mean- variance 
analysis first developed in the Modern Portfolio Theory by Harry M. Markowitz in 1952. This 
approach is based on the assumption, that all investors are rationale and risk averse. Rationale 
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investors only focus on the financial attributes of their investments and risk aversion refers to the 
preference of the least risky investment given the same return and all else equal. The mean-variance 
analysis is a “mathematical framework for mixing investments within a portfolio to calculate the 
expected returns for any given level of risk” (Shipway, 2009). 
 
In mean-variance optimization, the weights of the assets to be included in an investment portfolio 
are assessed by their relative risk and return attributes. The risk is represented by the asset’s 
standard deviation and correlation to the other assets in the portfolio. A mean-variance optimized 
portfolio will offer the highest level of return for each level of risk (S. Lee & Stevenson, 2005). 
Hence, selecting assets with diversification potential results “in an ability to construct a portfolio 
that had the same expected return and less risk than a portfolio constructed by ignoring the 
interactions between securities” (Elton & Gruber, 1997). Mean-variance optimization allows for 
the calculation of two essential portfolios for investors. The first portfolio is the tangency portfolio, 
which maximizes the portfolio Sharpe Ratio, which indicates the return per unit of risk. The second 
portfolio is the minimum-variance portfolio, which minimizes portfolio variance, ignoring 
portfolio returns. As the optimization process only focuses on the excess return and risk of a 
portfolio, the tangency portfolio may allocate extreme weights to certain assets, while excluding 
others. In order to control for extreme allocations, Byrne and Lee (1995) propose placing upper 
and lower bounds as constraints on the weights of each asset. This approach restricts exclusions or 
extreme allocations. There is substantial evidence in financial literature, that variances are more 
persistent throughout time than returns, thus the minimum variance portfolio is proven to be a better 
portfolio choice in an out of sample environment than the mean-variance optimized portfolio 
(Stevenson, 2001). The methodology of mean-variance optimization will discussed in detail in 
section 3.2.3.  
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The most significant limitation of the Modern Portfolio Theory is that calculations are based on 
historical data. Changing key return characteristics, in particular the time-varying correlations 
between asset classes indicate significantly changing optimal portfolios throughout an investment 
horizon. Hence, a portfolio allocation calculated through the mean-variance framework may only 
represent an optimal allocation for the analyzed sample period, while other sample periods could 
render different allocations due to changes in risk return characteristics. The same is true for an out 
of sample environment (S. Lee & Stevenson, 2005). There is a large amount of literature 
concerning the time-varying correlations between asset types as well as international 
diversification. Researchers have found strong evidence for increasing correlations during 
recessions. Especially during the financial crisis, correlations between asset classes increased, 
which drastically reduced diversification potential. Nevertheless, Asness et all (2011), find 
evidence for long term diversification benefits and highlight that “short, systemic crashes” cannot 
be prevented by diversification but do not invalidate the strategy. Correlations increase during 
crashes in line with an increase in volatility, for example the volatiliy indicator for the S&P 500, 
VIX had a ninefold increase at the peak of the crisis (Loviscek & Riley, 2013), which may serve 
as an indicator for market disturbances. The financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 will be discussed in 
greater detail in section 2.5. Next to time-varying correlations, there is evidence for increasing 
correlations across asset classes since the early 2000s, leading to less diversification potential and 
effectiveness of portfolio optimization. Reasons for this phenomenon may be the increased 
effciency and the growing gloablization of financial markets (Kolanovic, 2011). Further studies 
found evidence for an inverse relationship between correlations among asset classes and the state 
of the economy. For example Michel et al (2015) found evidence for increasing correlations 
between the S&P 500 and fixed income indices during poor market performance and lower 
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correlation during bullish and normal markets. This finding indicates, that a combination of equities 
and debt securities would offer diversification benefits during a healthy economy but would incur 
substantial losses during market crashes. In conclusion, the essential objective of diversification, 
to reduce risk and hedge against losses of certain assets does not hold during distressed periods 
where it is most needed.  
 
2.2. Asset Classes  
Investors have a variety of choices to invest their wealth and due to the concept of investor 
heterogeneity, various investment opportunities with differing risk/return characteristics exist to 
serve their investment criteriums. Hence, investors may range from individual investors with very 
limited funds to invest and high-risk aversion to large institutional investors like yield seeking 
hedge funds. There are two broad categories of assets, that investors can place their wealth in, real 
assets and financial assets. Real assets include the goods and services in an economy, which may 
be real estate, commodities, machines and other assets. Of these, purchases of commodities on 
specific exchanges and the acquisition of a property, also referred to as private or direct real estate 
investment, is a common real asset investment for investors. An analysis of the real estate market 
is provided in the section 2.3. 
2.2.1. Financial Assets 
Financial assets refer to various types of securities, which can be categorized into equity, fixed 
income and derivatives. These asset classes can be broken down into further categories and 
subcategories in order to create groups of securities with similar characteristics. Characteristics 
may be for example the behavior in the capital markets, risk or liquidity. Besides a classification 
of asset classes into financial assets and real assets, there is another traditional classification system, 
which overlaps with the one previously described. Here, assets are divided into four major asset 
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classes, namely cash, stocks, bonds and real estate. This system is simplified and does not include 
asset classes like derivatives. The following section will provide a brief overview of the different 
financial asset types and reviews corresponding literature concerning diversification potential and 
their role in mixed portfolios.  
 
The equities asset class refers to publicly traded firms who sell ownership shares on stock 
exchanges. Equities, also referred to as common stock, entitle the shareholder to voting rights and 
possibly dividends. Hence, this asset class is characterized by an uncertain payment stream 
resulting from dividends and capital gain when selling the shares at a premium to the purchase 
price. Stock prices reflect investors collective assessment for a firm’s current performance and 
future prospects. In case of a bankruptcy the value of the shares may become worthless, thus the 
shareholder bears the business risk. (Bodie et al., 2014). Hence, for assessing the share price of a 
firm, a company valuation is often conducted, that includes future growth prospects and the 
underlying risks of future cash flows. The most commonly quoted equity index in the US is the 
S&P 500, which is often used as a benchmark for equities. The S&P 500 index contains publicly 
traded corporations from a variety of sectors. The correlations between these firms also varies 
strongly, thus equity investors build portfolios with stocks that offer diversification benefits. 
However, the study from Loviscek and Riley (2013) estimated an increase in firm-level correlation 
in the S&P 500 of 75% during the financial crisis, indicating a systematic crash that decreased 
diversification capabilities and could not prevent substantial losses. In fact, the market 
capitalization of the US stock market dropped by more than 50% during the financial crisis. 
 
In contrast to the equity asset class, fixed income securities provide a fixed cash flow to investors. 
There are two general fixed income categories, money market securities and capital market 
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securities. Money market securities include debt securities with short maturities, high liquidity and 
low risk like US Treasury bills or Certificates of Deposit of large banks with maturities of less than 
a year. Certificates of deposit are deposits at banks which cannot be withdrawn and the payout 
takes place at maturity, Treasury bills are a major instrument for the US government to raise money 
and these securities are backed by the US Treasury, which is considered to be free of default risk. 
Hence, Treasury bills are commonly used as a proxy for risk-free assets. Capital market securities 
have a variety of forms and have vastly heterogenous characteristics in terms of maturity, liquidity, 
cash flow pattern as well as risk and return attributes. Examples for capital market debt securities 
are corporate bonds, Treasury bonds, mortgage securities and bonds issued by federal agencies and 
municipalities. The income of these debt securities is generally fixed or defined by a formula 
leading to specified cash flows for the bond investors (Bodie et al., 2014). Treasury bonds are 
issued by the US Treasury and backed by the Treasury, similar to Treasury bills. The income 
Treasury bond investors receive are fixed coupon payments at a specific interest rate and frequency 
as well as the face value of the bond at maturity. The discount rate for assessing bonds is called the 
yield to maturity (YTM) and depends on the risk of the bond. The main risk for bonds is the default 
risk of the bond issuer, which creates uncertainty about the payment of coupons and repayment of 
the face value. The default risk is particularly important for corporate bonds and investors typically 
assess the default risk through the issuer’s credit rating. Financial assets are commonly rated by 
the large American rating agencies Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. These ratings are used 
to “measure the ability of issuers to meet their future financial commitments, such as principal or 
interest payments” (Coval, Jurek, & Stafford, 2009). Investment grade ratings range from AAA to 
BBB- or equivalent, depending on the rating institution. Corporate bonds are a common instrument 
for firms to raise capital in the capital markets and its structure is similar to Treasury bonds. 
However, there are special types of corporate bonds, like secured and unsecured bonds, depending 
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on whether a collateral is backing the security in case of bankruptcy. Additionally, there are callable 
bonds, where the bond issuer has the right to repurchase the bond at a specified call price. Another 
major type of debt securities is federal agency debt. A large part of the mortgage securities falls 
under this category of fixed income, since federal agencies like the Federal National Mortgage 
Association issue mortgage backed securities backed by so called conforming mortgages. 
Mortgage backed securities, which are not issued by federal agencies due to nonconforming 
mortgages as collateral are called private label issued mortgages. Section 2.4 will discuss mortgage 
backed securities in greater detail.  
 
The third type of financial asset are derivatives, which are contract based complex securities with 
payoffs depending on the prices of the underlying assets. The main objective of derivatives is risk 
hedging and risk transfer. Examples are call and put options, future contracts and swaps. Another 
example are credit default swaps, which play a substantial role for certain securitized mortgage 
instruments and are discussed in section 2.4.3.   
 
2.3. Real Estate Investment Vehicles  
Real estate as the fourth traditional asset class may either be a financial asset or a real asset, 
depending on the real estate investment vehicle. Private real estate is considered a real asset versus 
indirect vehicles as financial assets. This section briefly examines the different property types 
available for investors, followed by a short description of private real estate and a more detailed 
description of the real estate investment trust (REIT) market as an important indirect real estate 
vehicle. 
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2.3.1. Overview of the Real Estate Market 
The main property types are residential, retail, office, industrial, hotel and specialty properties. 
Residential properties can be categorized into single family houses, apartments or multifamily 
buildings, as well as owner occupied or rental properties depending on the use of the property. 
Residential real estate primarily depends on the local population growth, employment and housing 
affordability. The owner-occupied housing depends strongly on the interest rate level since 
mortgages are commonly used for financing these properties. Retail properties are another major 
property type, which refer to retail stores, shops or shopping centers. These properties depend on 
disposable income levels and aggregate wealth of the targeted households as well as the local traffic 
volume. Office properties depend primarily on employment and office occupancy in the relevant 
market. The next property type is industrial properties, which also have a variety of sub-categories 
like factories, transportation properties or power plants. The demand for these assets depends on a 
variety of factors like employment in the specific segment, product demand and transportation 
volume. Industrial properties tend to have large investment volumes due their size and may only 
be suitable for direct investment for large institutional players. Hotel and convention properties 
mainly depend on leisure and business tourism numbers as well as air passenger volume. 
Additionally, there are specialty properties like leisure properties, for example theme parks or 
educational facilities like schools and universities (Geltner, Miller, Clayton, & Eichholtz, 2006). In 
theory, all property types could be invested in through both direct and indirect real estate investment 
vehicles, however, some property types may be more suitable than others for a certain vehicle. A 
major limiting factor for direct real estate is the indivisibility of the properties leading to large 
minimum investment volumes, thus shopping centers, industrial and large office or hotel properties 
may be less suitable for this vehicle.  
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2.3.2. Direct Real Estate Investments 
As stated above, private real estate is considered as a real asset and thus has substantial differences 
compared to financial assets. In contrast to financial assets, private real estate assets are not traded 
on exchanges and are highly heterogenous assets as each property has to be assessed individually. 
Private real estate is characterized by high capital requirements due to the direct acquisition of 
properties, low liquidity due to legal procedures for acquiring or selling properties and finding a 
counterparty that accepts the perceived adequate price. The last issue leads to another important 
aspect regarding direct real estate, which is the information inefficiency on transactions. Direct 
property transactions suffer from inaccuracy due to the uniqueness of properties, the lack of sale 
frequency and transaction repetition as well as the fact that sales only represent “the agreement of 
two parties, not a broad market consensus” (Geltner et al., 2006).  Additionally, substantial 
transaction costs caused by legal and brokerage fees as well as taxes occur during real estate 
transactions In order to mitigate the high capital requirements on property types like large retail or 
hospitality assets, partnerships between investors can made in order to pool capital to jointly 
acquire an asset (Brueggeman & Fisher, 2011). Nevertheless, direct real estate investment may 
benefit from a low correlation to financial assets, hence offering better protection against shocks 
in the market. Another advantage of private real estate are the potentially higher yields, since no 
management fees are paid and substantial tax benefits arise due to write off possibilities of 
mortgage debt as well as depreciation expenses. The valuation of private real estate depends on the 
property types, however most commercial properties are valued with the discounted cash flow 
(DCF) approach and owner-occupied housing through the comparison approach where current 
values of similar houses are adjusted to the subject property.  
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2.3.3. Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Next to direct real estate investments there are multiple vehicles for investing in indirect real estate. 
One of the largest indirect vehicles are Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), which are traded on 
stock exchanges and offer the liquidity and information advantages of traded companies. REITs 
offer the possibility of investing in a diversified real estate portfolio through a liquid instrument 
with small minimum investment volumes. These companies can be considered as the equity side 
of the public commercial real estate market compared to the debt side represented by commercial 
mortgage backed securities. Essentially, REITs are publicly traded companies that focus on real 
estate investments, which must qualify, through several requirements or tests, for corporate income 
tax exemption. An example for a private indirect vehicle for investing in real estate are private real 
estate investment funds. These vehicles offer increased liquidity, smaller minimum investments as 
well as more diversification as direct real estate investments. However, the liquidity of public real 
estate investments is not matched and prices of real estate funds or corresponding indices are based 
on appraisals which are subject to bias and inaccuracy (Lizieri, 2013). This study will focus on 
REITs as an indirect real estate investment vehicle.  
 
 REITs were created in the 1960s as part of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act, which allowed 
the pass-through structure of eligible real estate companies. This structure avoids double taxation, 
since earnings are only taxed at the individual shareholder’s personal income tax level. There are 
certain tests that REITs continuously have to meet, which are designed to “maintain REITs as 
somewhat passive investment vehicle, not too far removed from the original ‘mutual fund for real 
estate’ idea, and also to ensure that REIT investment is accessible to small individual 
investors”(Geltner et al., 2006). These requirements promote free-float, largely limit a REIT’s 
income to real estate assets and require substantial dividend distributions of the net income. REITs 
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are assessed similar to other traded firms by discounting expected future cash flows, however, due 
to the required focus on real estate assets, the value of the underlying properties plays a dominant 
role and are considered through the net asset value (NAV). The net asset value refers to the 
estimated current value of the assets owned by the REIT, deducted by the total liabilities 
(Brueggeman & Fisher, 2011). For the valuation of REITs, real estate fundamentals are combined 
with stock fundamentals. The key value drivers for REITs are the cash flows distributable to 
shareholders, the growth of the cash flows as well as the growth of the net asset value. The risk is 
reflected in the discount rate and reduces the value accordingly. REITs characteristically are highly 
levered, which is a main factor for the typically high levels of systematic risk for REITs. 
Nevertheless, Brounen and Koining (2012) discover lower volatility of REITs compared to the 
overall stock market. A REIT’s cash flows are measured in Funds From Operations (FFO), which 
is an earnings measure deviating from the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) Net 
Income. FFO is calculated by adjusting the GAAP Net Income by adding the real estate 
depreciation and amortization expense as well as the preferred stock dividends and subtracting the 
net gains from property sales and extraordinary items (Geltner et al., 2006). Typically, REIT stocks 
can be considered as income stocks due to the high dividend payout ratio required for the REIT 
status. Hence, these companies cannot retain large amounts of earnings for profitable investments, 
which lead to growth in the firm. Possibilities for growth is the purchase of properties and expected 
future growth through attractive development possibilities of existing land or development rights 
(Geltner et al., 2006).  
 
The market for REITs surged during the REIT IPO boom during 1993 and 1994, raising USD 16.5 
billion, followed by a surge in secondary offerings in 1997 and 1998, raising additional USD 32 
billion. During this bullish period for REITs, share prices for REITs soared, while real estate prices 
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remained relatively stable indicating an overvaluation of REIT stocks. In 1999 and 2000, the REIT 
market crashed due to a substantial loss in confidence in the REIT sector caused by the 
disconnection between real estate prices and REIT shares (Geltner et al., 2006). During the early 
2000s, after the dot com crash, the REIT market stabilized and prices soared in line with the general 
stock market. During the financial crisis, property prices plummeted and the cost of debt surged, 
leading to a strong decline in the REIT market.  
 
In conclusion, REITs offer more liquidity, property as well as market diversification potential, 
information efficiency and lower minimum capital requirements than direct real estate investments. 
Direct property offers potentially higher yields and substantial independence from financial 
markets (Geltner et al., 2006). 
 
2.3.4. Diversification Potential and Limitation of Real Estate Investments 
According to Lizieri (2013), reasons to include real estate in a diversified portfolio include 
“favorable risk-adjusted returns, inflation hedging qualities, and the benefits of diversification”. 
Hence, correlations between property returns and financial assets are expected to be low in order 
to qualify as an asset class with strong diversification capabilities. When considering direct real 
estate in a mean-variance optimization framework, several characteristics of this asset class may 
impose issues regarding the resulting portfolios. The indivisibility aspect and heterogenic lot sizes 
between different property types like apartments or shopping centers, creates significant hurdles 
for the optimization framework as the calculated weights may not be achievable. Indirect real estate 
investments like REITs do not suffer from these limitations and target allocations could be matched 
more easily. This issue is also true for other common allocation strategies like equal weight or risk 
parity portfolios. Another issue regarding direct property are appraisal based direct property returns, 
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which have a volatility smoothing characteristic that overstates the attractivity of this asset class 
and may create dominant weights in a mean- variance optimization. Hence, total return and non-
appraisal based indices should be considered for evaluating the allocation to direct real estate 
(Lizieri, 2013). As described above, the low correlation to equity markets and attractive risk and 
return attributes lead to high allocations of real estate in mean- variance optimized portfolios. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence for a lower asset allocation to real estate in investment portfolios 
than predicted by optimized portfolios amounting to 20 to 30% (Brounen, Prado, & Verbeek, 2010). 
According to Brounen, Prado and Verbeek (2010), direct real estate offers short term inflation 
hedging benefits when accounting for interest rate risk, however, “over longer holding periods real 
estate proves to be a poor interest rate and particularly poor inflation hedge”. Similar to direct real 
estate, they find evidence for diversification potential and attractive risk reward characteristics for 
indirect real estate, though no significant inflation hedging capabilities. Additionally, the study 
found an increasing allocation to indirect real estate in efficient portfolios with higher risk tolerance 
that goes in line with a decrease in direct real estate allocation (Brounen et al., 2010). 
 
2.3.5. Real Estate During the Financial Crisis 
According to Lizieri (2013), real estate assets could not provide the diversification and hedging 
attributes previously anticipated during the financial crisis. Property returns were expected to 
“insulate the portfolio against drawdown during bear markets” (Lizieri, 2013). However, during 
the crisis, property returns plummeted throughout property types and markets. Moreover, evidence 
was found for increasing correlations of real estate to financial assets during the crisis. This 
indicates the time-varying correlation of real estate to equity markets. In fact, Lizieri (2013) found 
evidence for time-varying correlations of both private and public real estate to financial assets, 
which peaked during bear periods of the stock market. Hence, the promised insulation against a 
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drawdown did not become true since the diversification benefits weakened during the critical 
periods. During bullish periods, correlations between private real estate and financial assets were 
found to be low indicating diversification benefits, though this relationship diminished during the 
crisis, which was caused by market illiquidity and inaccurate appraisals due to lags and asymmetric 
market information. The findings of Lizieri (2013) are evidence against the attributes discovered 
by Hudson-Wilson et al. (2003) and Chun et al. (2004), who suggested strong hedging capabilities 
due to pay-offs during bear markets.   
 
2.4. Mortgage Backed Securities 
Mortgage backed securities are an essential part of the US fixed income market, accounting for 
around 25%. MBS have unique risk/return characteristics, differentiating this asset class from other 
debt instruments. MBS are fixed income securities, which have a pool of home or commercial 
mortgages as a collateral. This section begins with a detailed overview of mortgage backed 
securities, continuing with the history of MBS, followed by a brief explanation of the valuation 
methods for MBS. Subsequently, structured mortgage instruments are analyzed and the remainder 
of the section is focused on the financial crisis, focusing on the role of MBS and rating agencies.   
 
2.4.1. Overview and Origin of Mortgage Backed Securities 
There are two major types of mortgage backed securities, depending on the underlying collateral 
of the mortgage. The first type of MBS are residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), which 
refer to pools of mortgages taken on by homeowners to finance the acquisition of their homes. The 
second type are commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS), which refer to “debt instruments 
collateralized by non-recourse loans which are secured by commercial real estate”, usually 
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apartment properties, retail centers, hotels, restaurants, warehouses and office buildings (Maxam 
& Fisher, 2001). 
 
The market for mortgages originates in the provision of long-term loans to homebuyers by local 
saving banks, which receive a pledge on the property as the collateral. For homeowners to be 
eligible for a mortgage, certain criteria had to be met by the potential borrower in terms of stable 
income history, documentation and other criteria. According to the terms of the loan, the borrower 
provides frequent payments to the originator including the interest payments as well as 
amortization payments, which reduce the remaining loan amount (Fabozzi, 2005). The general 
level of interest rates for mortgages depends on the interest environment of the economy, similar 
to treasury bonds. The characteristics of the interest payments differs, depending on the loan type 
as well as maturity and are specified during the closing of the loan. There are fixed rate mortgages 
and those with variable interest rates, the so- called adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), which are 
linked to a market rate index. Some ARM loans start with lower initial interest rates that 
subsequently rise to a fixed spread over the specified index (Fabozzi, 2005). These types of loans 
played a particularly important role during the financial crisis, which will be discussed in greater 
detail in section 2.5. The term for mortgages usually amounts to either 15 or 30 years. An important 
aspect of mortgages is, that homeowners have the right to prepay their mortgages with additional 
amortization payments. This leads to uncertainty with regards to the maturity of the mortgage, since 
it could be repaid at any time during the term.  
 
In order to increase the supply of loans, bankers made use of securitization, where mortgages were 
bundled into pools, which could be traded as financial assets and had a high demand in the financial 
markets. (Bodie et al., 2014). These financial assets are referred to as mortgage-pass-through 
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securities and are treated as fixed income securities. The cash flows of these securities are passed 
through to the MBS investor and consist of the interest-and amortization payments as well as the 
prepayments from the borrowers. There are two types of mortgage pass-through securities, agency 
pass-through securities and nonagency or private label pass-through securities. The first type of 
securities are mortgage pools with a credit guarantee provided by government sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs). There are three GSEs, Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie 
Mae), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). During the peak of the financial crisis, on September 6, 2008 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship of the Federal Housing and Finance 
Agency in order to be backed by the full faith of the US Department of Treasury “to provide 
financial support […] to continue to provide liquidity and stability to the mortgage market” 
(Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2008). Hence, all three agencies are backed by the US 
Department of Treasury since Ginnie Mae has already been a government agency before the 
financial crisis. The second type are mortgage pools that are not guaranteed by a GSE, but by 
private firms, like commercial banks or thrifts, and thus may have some degree of credit risk in the 
insurance (Fabozzi, 2005). For loans to qualify as an agency loan, particular requirements in terms 
of borrower credit worthiness as well as loan size have to be met. For example, the agencies state 
loan size limits, thus more expensive properties often do not qualify for the agency loans and are 
referred to as jumbo loans. Chart 1 displays the pass-through structure of MBS. The loan originators 
sell the conforming mortgages for a premium to financial institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac and may continue to collect the interest (I) and amortization (P) of the homeowners for a 
service fee and transfer it to the mortgage pool. The mortgage pool is securitized into a MBS by 
the financial institution and subsequently sold to investors who will receive the payments of the 
homeowners. Guaranty institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac further guarantee the default 
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and credit risk of the mortgages for a guarantee fee (Kariya & Kobayashi, 2000). This structure is 
called pass-throughs since the cash flows are passed through from the home owners to the final 
investor. 
 
Chart 1: Cash Flows in a MBS, adopted from (Bodie et al., 2014) 
The second type of RMBS are MBS with non-agency mortgages as collateral. These mortgages 
did not qualify the requirements for conforming mortgages due to a lack of credit worthiness of the 
borrower, unsupported type of property and other reasons. Non-agency MBS are characterized by 
an exposure to the default risk of the homeowner, since there are no guarantees on the cash flows. 
The market for non-agency MBS grew quickly between 2000 and 2006, reaching a 56% market 
share in MBS issuances in 2006 and more than USD 1 trillion in issuances. A market analysis of 
MBS issuances is provided in the market analysis in section 3.1.1.   
 
The second category of MBS are CMBS, which have a substantially smaller market than RMBS 
but, similar to RMBS, were created to increase supply of commercial mortgages. In order to 
overcome the general issues of illiquidity of real estate investments, securitization as a tool for 
innovative financing is used. The income achieved through these products is characterized by the 
“receipt or payment of a predictable and dependable income streams i.e. rents or loan payment” 
(Solomon & McCluskey, 2010). Furthermore, CMBS are characterized by the non-recourse 
attribute, which refers to the concept, that in case of a borrower default, the lender has only access 
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to the proceeds from the sale of the underlying real estate as no guarantee is provided (Fabozzi, 
2005). Further key differences between CMBS and RMBS are the preclusion of pre-payments, 
since these mortgage agreements either prohibit or penalize the refinancing. Secondly, there are no 
guarantees provided from government agencies like FNMA and GNMA to eliminate the credit risk, 
which leads to default risk of the borrower as the main pricing parameter for CMBS (Maxam & 
Fisher, 2001).  
 
When comparing mortgage backed securities to the traditional fixed income securities in terms of 
key attributes, there are several differences that potentially render MBS investments more attractive 
than other fixed income securities. The main risk of corporate bonds is the credit risk of the issuing 
company. If the company is unable to pay the promised coupon or face value, the bond holder 
incurs losses. The riskiness of the repayment is represented in the discount rate used for pricing the 
bond. Agency- MBS do not have credit risk, since their coupon and principal payments are 
guaranteed by the US Department of Treasuries. Non- agency- MBS are subject to similar credit 
risk as corporate bonds or government bonds. However, instead of credit risk, agency- MBS are 
exposed to prepayment risk since the mortgage holders have the option to prepay their mortgages 
leading to losses for mortgage investors. The homeowners have an incentive for repayment in case 
of falling interest rates as they can refinance their mortgages cheaper with the lower interest rates. 
Since the mortgage investors expect a certain rate of prepayment, less prepayment than expected, 
caused by rising interest rates, may also lead to an extension risk. In this scenario, MBS investors 
receive less prepayments than expected and can invest less funds in the attractive high interest rate 
environment. Thus, the prepayment and extension risk renders MBS cash flows more uncertain. 
Fixed coupon bonds, on the contrary have fixed coupon payments, that are only subject to the 
described credit risk and interest rate risk (Rowley Jr., 2013).  
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2.4.2. Valuation of Mortgage Backed Securities 
As mentioned above, homeowners have the right to prepay their mortgages at any time, which 
creates a prepayment risk in addition to the interest rate risk for the MBS investor (Kariya & 
Kobayashi, 2000). The prepayment behavior of homeowners is heterogenic and depends on 
economic as well as noneconomic reasons rendering MBS valuation highly complex. Prepayments 
may occur due to refinancing, the sale of the property or due to the default of the borrower. A 
refinancing incentive arises when the current interest rate for mortgages drops abruptly below the 
initial contracted mortgage rate (Kariya & Kobayashi, 2000). In case of declined mortgage rates, it 
may be profitable for the homeowner to take on a new, cheaper loan and paying off the initial 
mortgage with the proceeds. Incentives for selling the house may be economic or noneconomic. 
Noneconomic or personal reasons could be changes in personal circumstances like family or 
employment. Economic circumstances refer to profitable opportunities for selling the house, since 
the value of the house appreciated. The prepayment rates due to selling the house, in particular due 
to personal reasons, are difficult to estimate due to the lack of reliable information. Economic and 
demographic variables are commonly used for estimating prepayments. The prepayment option of 
borrowers can be compared to a callable bond, where the bond issuer has the right of calling the 
bond. In this case, the borrower can call or in this case prepay the loan at the remaining loan balance. 
When disregarding the non-interest rate related incentives for repayment of the loan, the value of 
a MBS depends largely on the interest rate since the principle value decreases in line with the 
interest rate (Bodie et al., 2014).  
 
In 2006, the government- sponsored enterprises (GSE) held credit guarantees for nearly 50% of all 
outstanding residential mortgages in the US, indicating their importance for a functioning market 
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(Downing, Jaffee, Wallace, Mae, & Mac, 2009). Hence, the default risk for GSE backed RMBS 
could be neglected due to the guarantees and the single determining risk factor for RMBS was the 
prepayment risk. The GSEs would repay the principle of the mortgage in case of the default of the 
borrower, in return, during the pass-through process of the mortgage, a fee for the GSE is deducted. 
The prepayment characteristics of MBS makes its valuation complex since the maturity of the 
mortgages included in the MBS depend on the prepayments of the mortgages. The value of a MBS 
can be decomposed into a riskless bond (due to the guarantee provided by the guaranty institution) 
and the prepayment option (Kariya, Ushiyama, & Pliska, 2011). This option represents a significant 
risk for the value of a MBS portfolio and “depending on the interest rate environment, prepayment 
can either hurt or benefit the MBS investor” (Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, & Vigneron, 2007). 
Prepayments rates due to reasons other than refinancing can be combined to turnover rates which 
include prepayments due to the sale of houses, property destruction, borrower default and partial 
prepayment. When homeowners prepay their mortgages early, mortgage investors lose the interest 
income receivable in the future, hence early repayment or prepayment is not desired by investors. 
As discussed, homeowners have various reasons for repayment, thus part of the mortgages may be 
expected to be repaid constantly throughout the term of the mortgage pool. This turnover rate tends 
to be relatively stable and is primarily influenced by the “levels of real estate appreciation and 
home resale values” (Fabozzi, 2005). Informed, rationale investors may be referred to as efficient 
investors, who prepay when mortgage interest rates drop or property prices rise (M. Lee & Pace, 
2006). This relationship indicates, that the more inefficient the homeowners of the mortgage pool 
are, the higher is the value of the underlying mortgages, since more mortgages are held until 
maturity (Downing et al., 2009). In case of a rationale investor, the mortgage holder “has a high-
yielding asset payoff” when interest rates dropped, leading to the inability to reinvest the proceeds 
at a similar rate (Fabozzi, 2005). 
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The value of a MBS follows the concept of negative convexity, when interest rates decline, the 
value of the MBS decreases due to prepayments and when rates increase, the value of the mortgage 
pool decreases due to duration effects. Duration refers to the “weighted average time (in years) 
until the bond’s future cash flows will be received. The weighting is proportional to the component 
of each future cash flow in the present value of the bond” (Geltner et al., 2006). In contrast to 
straight bonds, the MBS price has no linear relationship with the interest rate, instead, less 
appreciation due to declined interest rate and more depreciation due to duration as well as extension 
effects can be observed. This underperformance of MBS is compensated by higher base yields than 
comparable bonds (Fabozzi, 2005). The negative convexity characteristic of MBS can be seen in 
chart 2.  
 
 















Negative convexity of MBS
Bond MBS
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There are multiple approaches for valuing the prepayment option. A widely used model is 
considering the prepayment option as a call option on the underlying mortgage (Schwartz & Torous, 
1989). Thus, when homeowners exercise their prepayment option out of the money due to personal 
reasons or cost constrains, the value of the mortgage increases for investors. Kariya, Ushiyama and 
Pliska (2011) propose a three-factor pricing model based on the research of Kariya and Kobayashi 
(2000), using the mortgage rate as the discount factor and breaking down the prepayment option 
into two factors, the prepayment due to refinancing or due to selling the property. However, this 
two-factor approach ignores the noneconomic incentives described above. Hence, a complete 
model for valuing MBS would require further factors for which accurate data is not available. A 
possible factor could analyze the positive difference between the property value and the loan size 
which correlates with the default rate. Additionally, a factor could be related to the availability of 
credit which depends on rising housing prices since higher valued houses indicate larger collaterals 
for the lenders leading to less restrictive lending standards. These inefficiencies in MBS pricing, 
may have played a role during the subprime crisis, since a more complete MBS pricing model may 
have been capable of giving warning signals before the sub-prime crisis (Kariya et al., 2011). 
 
The valuation of CMBS is less complex than of RMBS, since prepayments are prohibited. Valuing 
CMBS depends on two components, a straight bond and the option to default, which indicates the 
difference to RMBS, which have the option to repay. Defaulting on a mortgage is strictly economic 
decision, which renders the valuation of CMBS less complex compared to RMBS, since only 
market parameters are used for estimating the default instead of a combination of personal and 
economic factors which is the case for RMBS (Maxam & Fisher, 2001). The main parameters 
affecting the defaults are the property value, the mortgage value and the income received from the 
properties. In their study, Maxam and Fisher (2001) found that due to the less systematic nature of 
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defaults than pre-payments, “CMBS exhibit much more stable cash flows […] and hence less 
reinvestment risk than residential MBS”.  
 
2.4.3. Overview of Structured Mortgage Instruments 
In this sub-section, the market for structure mortgage instruments is described, which are financial 
products, that repackage a portfolio of mortgages into segments with specific attributes which may 
be attractive to certain investors that are willing to pay a premium for these. Structured finance 
instruments refer to financial products, where cash flow generating assets like bonds, various types 
of loans as well as mortgages are pooled together and “prioritized capital structure[s] of claims, 
known as tranches, against these collateral pools” are created (Coval et al., 2009). Examples of 
structured finance instruments are collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and collateralized 
mortgage obligations (CMOs. Collateralized debt obligations are repackaged pools of cash flow 
generating assets, which have mortgages, loans or bonds as collateral. CDOs can take various forms 
depending on the cash generating asset and underlying collateral. Collateralized loan obligations 
include loans as collateral and generate income through the debt service of the loans. A more 
complex type of CDOs are Synthetic CDOs, which have credit default swaps (CDS) as collateral. 
CDS are used to separate the credit risk from the corresponding asset and work similar to an 
insurance for the CDS purchaser. The synthetic CDO generates cash flow through the fees from 
the credit protection purchasers and distributes these fees in tranches to the CDO investors. 
However, in the event that a “defined credit event occurs on those reference assets, the CDO 
receives a payment from its investors and makes a payment to the counterparties that have bought 
credit protection from the CDO” (Fabozzi, 2005) 
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Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO) are a form of collateralized debt obligations, which 
use mortgage pools as the underlying collateral. These products were initially engineered during 
the years before the financial crisis with the purpose of generating more profits in the booming 
market (Mackenzie, 2011). Most CMOs are created from agency pass through mortgage pools and 
hence contain homogenous high-quality mortgage pools. The CMO repackages the cash flows 
received from underlying mortgage pools into tranches according to investor preferences. Tranches 
may vary according to the prepayment exposure; common types are sequential and planned 
amortization class tranches. Sequential tranches may be structured to first receive prepayments to 
shorten the duration or planned amortization class (PAC) tranches which receive prescheduled cash 
flows independent of the underlying mortgage pool. Additionally, tranches are created to modify 
the interest payments. CDOs create floater and inverse Floaters, which change the fixed interest 
payments of the underlying mortgages to variable ones, that are linked to interest rate indices like 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The floater would move in line with the LIBOR rate, 
while the inverse Floater has an inverse exposure to interest rate movements. Finally, there are 
altered versions of these tranche types to replicate certain characteristics and exposures that are 
attractive to certain investors (Fabozzi, 2005). Besides the agency CMOs, there is a market for non-
agency CMOs which substantially benefit from the credit enhancement possibilities CMOs offer. 
Non-conforming loans like jumbo loans or subprime/ Alt-A mortgage pools are commonly 
repackaged to non-agency CMOs. These mortgage pools are exposed to default risk and the 
prepayment behavior may be more heterogeneous compared to agency MBS pools.  
 
In structured finance products, a prioritization scheme is created in order to structure the claims of 
the cash flows of the underlying asset pool according to different risk/ return profiles. This process 
enables repackaging the risk of the asset pool to create tranches of different risk levels. Since 
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structured securities like CDOs are rated by rating agencies like Standard and Poor’s (S&P), 
Moodie’s and Fitch, the tranches receive different ratings according to their risk exposure. Hence, 
tranches of superior ratings compared to the average collateral risk can be created (Coval et al., 
2009). Non-agency CMO tranches may be structured according to default risk exposure, where 
senior tranches are most protected against defaults. CMO cash flows are distributed in a waterfall 
structure according to the seniority of the loans, thus the junior or subordinate tranches receive 
interest payments and principal payments only after the more senior tranches have been paid. This 
process is referred to as credit enhancement since senior tranches receive AAA ratings out of much 
lower rated pool of MBS due to the transferred default risk to the subordinate tranches, which 
receive ratings below the investment grade. The expected yield for CMO investors of the tranches 
is structured according to their seniority, thus subordinate CMO tranches are compensated by 
higher yields. Typical investors for the subordinate tranches are hedge funds and other specialized 
investors, who can assess and hedge the involved risks. In addition to the subordination technique, 
measures like overcollateralization are used for credit enhancement, where excess collateral is 
placed in the CMO in order to protect against losses due to defaults (Fabozzi, 2005). In order to 
further benefit from credit enhancement, the tranching process used in CDOs can be extended by 
creating a pool of junior or subordinate tranches of CDOs to create a so called CDO-squared, which 
repackages the pool of tranches, similar to the conventional CDO (Coval et al., 2009). Here the 
credit enhancement process can create AAA rated tranches out of a pool of unrated subordinate 
tranches due to the discussed credit enhancement technique that theoretically absorbs the risks.  
 
During the financial crisis, the market for structured finance instruments grew significantly. Due 
to the soaring market for subprime mortgages, a large portion of the CMOs contained subprime 
and other non-conforming mortgages. The expected return of these structured products is very 
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sensitive to its parameters like default rates and default correlations. Since these parameters were 
estimated through complex historical models, adequate data for default rates of these loans were 
not available. The complexity and nature of structured finance instruments like CMOs amplifies 
the exposure to changing market conditions and in particular the senior tranches concentrate the 
systematic risks, since the idiosyncratic risk portion is transferred to the junior and subordinate 
tranches (Coval et al., 2009). This circumstance makes structured products like CMOs particularly 
prone for substantial losses during market crashes. Although yields of AAA rated CMO senior 
tranches exceed those of similarly rated corporate bonds, which indicates partial compensation for 
increased systematic risk exposure of CMOs, the study of Coval et al. (2009) highlights, that this 
risk premium is insufficient for the expected losses during recessions. Moreover, the yields of the 
senior tranches are still low as a supposedly safe investment grade asset, causing the junior tranches 
to be overcompensated in excessive yields. Hence, many investors were incentivized to invest in 
the highly risky junior tranches, further fueling the subprime mortgage market, since the additional 
supply of subprime mortgage financing reduced the borrowing costs. Finally, a crucial aspect of 
CDOs is the correlation of the underlying assets. The less correlation between the underlying assets 
exists, the more effective is the credit enhancement and the potentially safer the senior tranche can 
be (Coval et al., 2009). The CDO- squared are significantly more sensitive to parameter changes 
than normal CDOs since increased default rates or default correlations impact the CDO-squared 
tranches heavily. In order to hedge their credit risk exposure, CDO/CMO investors can acquire 
credit default swaps (CDS) as insurance against the default of the purchased tranches. However, 
the credit risk of the insurer has to be considered. 
2.5. The Financial Crisis and the Role of Mortgage Backed Securities 
The financial crisis is considered as the worst crisis since the Great Depression and formed 
relatively quickly. Securitized mortgage instruments played a substantial role during the financial 
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crisis. In order to fully understand the risk nature of these assets as well as the historical behavior 
during the crisis a detailed overview of the financial crisis is provided in this section. First, the 
events leading to the financial crisis are described, followed by a sub-section concerned with the 
key stakeholders of the crisis.  
 
2.5.1. Circumstances Leading to the Financial Crisis 
During the years before the crisis, the economy was healthy and expanded continuously since the 
high-tech bubble in the early 2000s. After the high-tech bubble, the US economy was shaped by a 
low interest rate environment due to extensive foreign investment and a lax interest rate policy by 
the Federal Reserve the boost the economy (Brunnermeier, 2009). Also, financial institutions 
changed their business model towards the securitization process to subsequently distribute instead 
of lend and hold the loans. Instruments like CDOs became very popular and allowed banks to 
transfer the credit risk of the originated assets to other parties. This process reduced the incentive 
for banks to assess the risk and loan performance of the securitized mortgage pools (Brunnermeier, 
2009).  These characteristics of the economy lead to a soaring housing market because the low 
interest rates and confidence in the economy increased the hunt for yields of investors and the 
attractiveness of alternative investments as well as the accessibility of loans.  
 
The increased number of MBS created by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were highly demanded, 
however the supply of low-risk conforming mortgages, which were originated during the years 
before the financial crisis, had limits. The majority of originated mortgages qualified as conforming 
mortgages, where borrowers had to present various indicators for income stability and long-term 
ability to pay back the mortgages. This characteristic lead to the low default risk of agency 
mortgages and rendered lenders more optimistic during the years before the financial crisis and 
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GSEs provided credit guarantees for these loans effectively eliminating the mortgage’s default risk. 
The subprime market for mortgages already existed since the inception of the MBS market, 
however its size was very small in comparison to the total MBS market. The subprime non-agency-
MBS market evolved as the credit scoring technologies improved and online investigations became 
possible. The new technologies enabled automated underwriting through automated online scoring 
of potential borrowers, which saved a significant amount of time and money per loan application. 
This sharp decrease in application processing costs increased the profitability of the mortgage 
originators. These processes generated a 40% increase in subprime mortgages resulting in $ 450 
Billion of subprime loans in 2005 which accounted for 20% of new loans and 10% of total mortgage 
loans that year (Johnson & Neave, 2008). The qualitative assessment of loan applicants was 
essentially substituted for automated scoring programs, which selected conforming borrowers 
through fixed attributes. This lead to a large amount of approved subprime borrowers.  
 
The growing market attracted new players, increasing the competition for mortgages and in order 
to maintain the profit levels, the requirements for conforming mortgages were relaxed by the loan 
originators. Since mortgages were insured against defaults by wall street banks, the incentive for 
adequately inspecting the loan applicants was reduced, since default risk was transferred to the 
insurer. Moreover, new forms of mortgages, like teaser loans, were created with initial low interest 
rates and subsequent adjustable interest rates linked market rates. These loans further attracted 
subprime borrowers and when interest rates increased, default rates soared (Johnson & Neave, 
2008). These mortgages had significantly more default risk because the lenders needed to proof 
less credit worthiness, however with increasing risk for the MBS investors, risk monitoring 
activities were not altered. The riskier MBS portfolios were still insured against default risk and 
some insurers even reduced insurance fees for gaining market share, reducing the incentive for 
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investors to increase risk management activities. Besides, the MBS portfolios were tranched into 
tailored risk/return profiles depending on ratings and prepayment expectations, which 
corresponded to different risk exposure profiles of investors. The competitive yields of the 
MBS/CDO portfolios and tailored risk profiles were attractive investments and lead to a booming 
subprime MBS market in the years before the financial crisis. According to Johnson & Neave 
(2008), the warning signs of “growing competition for new loans, relaxation of quality screening, 
and under-emphasis of residual risks” were ignored by the market participants due to the strong 
returns and the supposedly inexistent default risk thanks to credit insurances. 
 
Before the financial crisis 75% of mortgage loans were securitized by GSE like Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. The securitized portfolios are sold to specialized investors and the default risk 
remains with insurer or in case of uninsured mortgages the default risk is transferred to the investor. 
Due to complex nature of securitized and tranched instruments like CDOs, the residual risk is often 
obscured. Investors of non-agency-MBS were institutional and specialized investors, which 
focused on the prepayment risk and interest rates of their MBS tranches. They ignored the default 
risk and relied on the ratings provided by the rating agencies. On the one side the high supply for 
MBS financing and on the other side, the high demand for mortgages, lead to the booming market 
between the early 2000s and 2007. The high supply for MBS financing originated from the lack of 
attractive investment alternatives for institutional investors during this period. The originators also 
contributed to the supply, since they could achieve high profits through the automated screening 
processes and focused on increasing the number of underwritings. Moreover, house prices rose by 
11% per year between 2002 and 2007 leading to potentially high resale values of the properties, 
and reinforced expectations of continuous growth (Acharya & Richardson, 2009). For an increase 
in mortgage demand in line with the high supply, loan requirements were relaxed as described 
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above, and the subprime mortgage market soared leading to a high number of homeowners being 
attracted by low down payments and teaser loans with initial interest rates as low as 1% (Johnson 
& Neave, 2008). The low short-term investment horizon during the booming years of 2005-2007 
appeared favorable in particular for the adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), but borrowers 
underestimated the potential for increasing interest rates leading to signigicantly higher mortgage 
costs. Teaser loans accounted for 80% of subprime mortgages and a slighly lower risk category for 
mortgages was created called Alt-A loans, which, similar to the subprime loans required 
downpayments of less than 10% and documentation of the borrowers was rarely inspected (Johnson 
& Neave, 2008). Before the crisis, around 40% of all mortgages were classified as subprime or Alt-
A mortgages and since interest rates rose after 2004, the ARM debt payments became much higher. 
Moreover, at the beginning of the financial crisis, house prices started to decrease, leading to 
mortgages being of higher value than the underlying properties. Increased mortgages payments and 
decreased property values lead to increasing default rates and the defualt insurances became more 
costly in 2007, as insurers lost confidence in the booming market. These increased costs and risks 
could not be covered by many mortgage lenders, resulting in bancrupcies of 30 subprime lenders 
in early 2007 (Johnson & Neave, 2008). In line with a large number of defaults, the liquidity of the 
MBS market decreased substantially. Illiquidity in the mortgage market resulted in the inability to 
price securities and the credit spreads increased significantly (Johnson & Neave, 2008). This 
liquidity shock created a contagion, since investors attempted to sell their depreciated assets, but 
due to the illiquidity, there were no buyers in the market leading to a downward spiral that affected 
the overall market (Cohen-Cole & Sabry, 2014) 
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2.5.2. System of Perverse Incentives during the Financial Crisis  
A system of perverse incentives that was developed in the private label and subprime mortgage 
market during the booming years before the financial crisis. Incentives for all stakeholders in the 
mortgage market were created to take advantage of the system without taking increased risk 
measures into consideration. The homeowners were incentivized to take mortgages they would not 
be able to pay back through multiple methods. First, the requirements for mortgages applicants 
were substantially reduced, which lead to the so-called liar loans, where borrowers could provide 
incorrect information in their mortgage application forms without facing consequences due to no 
subsequent data inspection. Secondly, the loan to value ratios increased to levels, where 
homeowners were not required to leave any or only below 10% of the property value as down 
payment for their mortgages. Finally, mortgage brokers attempted to aggressively attract subprime 
borrowers through teaser loans, which required very low initial interest rates, that would eventually 
increase to become adjustable rate mortgages with high spreads (Johnson & Neave, 2008). The 
combination of these mechanisms created the situation, that low-income borrowers took on 
mortgages without an equity commitment in their homes, which had the potential to become 
substantially more expensive through the ARM characteristic of the loans when interest rates rise. 
Thus, the probability as well as the incentive for homeowners to default on their mortgages was 
high when the interest rates rose. 
 
 Similar to the homeowners, brokers had strong incentives for offering as many mortgages as 
possible due to the fees earned through origination. Lenders focused on generating fees, rather than 
assessing the default risk of the loans originated. The resulting competition in the booming market 
lead to a continuous relaxation of credit requirements in order to maintain profit levels. Since 
subprime borrowers were not allowed to obtain conforming agency mortgages due to credit 
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restrictions, private label MBS were created with credit guarantees from Wall Street banks. These 
guarantees were, in contrast to the agency MBS, not backed by the US government and contained 
credit risk of the insuring bank. The default risk of the borrowers lost importance, since the loans 
were sold to investors in pools and insurers provided cheap insurances on the loans. Meanwhile 
ratings of these products remained on high levels. The complexity of the mortgage portfolios 
increased diversification effects, but “the opaqueness of the asset portfolios underlying the pool 
securities required extra diligence on the part of rating agencies, which apparently was not 
exercised in many cases” (Johnson & Neave, 2008). When the mortgage market became riskier 
through subprime mortgages and more complex securitization, lenders missed the opportunity to 
increase risk measures by increasing loan requirements and inspecting borrowers as well as 
monitoring existing mortgages (Johnson & Neave, 2008).  
 
Financial institutions played a key role during the financial crisis with regards to structured 
products, because these institutions differed from their original role as a financial intermediary 
securitizing or packaging mortgages and other collateralized debt to CMOs and CDOs and 
subsequently selling the tranches to investors. Instead many commercial banks from the Wall Street 
became investors themselves and held large amounts of senior CMO and CDO tranches as these 
required low levels of capital requirements and provided superior returns compared to other AAA 
rated instruments like corporate bonds and AAA rated Credit Default Swaps (Acharya & 
Richardson, 2009). The pooling of a large number of mortgages diversifies away the specific risk 
of individual mortgages due to their low mutual correlations. The only risk remaining is the 
systematic risk of the mortgage pool, correlated to the overall economy. In particular the senior 
CMO tranches with subprime mortgages as collaterals were highly sensitive to systematic market 
downturns since these tranches only default, when the majority of underlying mortgages defaults 
                                                                       MBS IN A DIVERSIFIED PORTFOLIO  36 
and the subordinate tranches have already defaulted. This situation would go in line with a 
substantial crash of the market and banks betted against this scenario, but for risk management 
purposes, many institutions hedged against a market collapse through credit default swaps provided 
by large insurers like American Insurance Group (A.I.G). In 2007, the gross notional amount 
outstanding of CDS ranged between USD 45 and 62 Trillion (Brunnermeier, 2009). However, when 
the market collapsed, the insurers were not able to deliver the promised insurance payments since 
the large amount of credit events occurred in a short period of time and insurers like A.I.G. had to 
file for bankruptcy, leading to losses of “158 to 473 billion on their holdings of AAA-tranches of 
mortgage- backed securities” for the financial sector (Acharya & Richardson, 2009). “The failure 
of the likes of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Lehman Brothers, which invested in the securities 
created out of these mortgages, led to severe counterparty risk concerns that paralyzed capital 
markets and thus caused the worldwide recession” (Acharya & Richardson, 2009).  
 
Another stakeholder of the mortgage system are the regulators, which failed to put in place 
regulations that prevented the described spiral into more and more risky financial products and 
subprime mortgages. The Basel 1 and Basel 2 regulations, which were in place during the financial 
crisis, tied bank’s capital to assets to AAA-ratings, not differentiating between ratings for bonds or 
structured instruments like CDOs (Johnson & Neave, 2008). This further increased the incentive 
for these institutions to invest in AAA- rated tranches of CDOs and CMOs with attractive yields. 
Additionally, financial institutions deferred from ususal practices of transferring the credit risk of 
their investments to investors during the securitization process. Instead, large financial instituitons 
like investment banks, insurance companies and hedge funds were heavily invested in the risky 
junior and subordinate tranches of CMOs and CDOs (Acharya & Richardson, 2009). When these 
assets became illiquid during the financial crisis these firms had substantial amounts of junior 
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tranches and subprime pools on their balance sheets as investors stopped investment into these 
tranches (Coval et al., 2009). Market participants admitted after the crisis, that key stakeholders 
were aware of the risks they were taking and that they decided to ignore them to gain short term 
profits. A leaked email from a manager at a rating agency in December 2006 is representative of 
this behavior, describing, that their structured finance rating behavior creates an “even bigger 
monster—the CDO market. Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of 
cards falters” (SEC, 2008).The rating framework did not take into account the complexity and the 
substantial systematic risk nature of the securitized private label mortgages. For improving the 
transparency of structured products, it is crucial to recognize that CDOs unlike “traditional 
corporate bonds, whose fortunes are primarily driven by firm-specific considerations, the 
performance of securities created by tranching large asset pools is strongly affected by the 
performance of the economy as a whole”(Coval et al., 2009). This circumstance point to the final 
stakeholder in this crisis, the rating agencies.  
 
The major rating agencies Moody’s, S&P and Fitch were in charge of providing credit ratings for 
fixed income products like mortgage backed securities. These institutions have access to privileged 
information and thus have a large responsibility for providing accurate and objective ratings. 
However, criticism arose due to conflicts of interests during the financial crisis, since the issuers 
pay the fees for the credit ratings instead of the investors (He, Qian, & Strahan, 2011). On the one 
side, this structure may have led to biased ratings, since the rating agencies attempted to secure 
future mandates, but on the other side the agencies were concerned of potential losses of reputations 
due to inaccurate ratings. During the years before the financial crisis, the top five issuers of private 
MBS deals accounted for 38 to 47% of the total private MBS deals and thus had substantial 
bargaining power. Since the demand for AAA rated assets is the highest an incentive for rating 
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agencies was created to provide the top ratings (He et al., 2011). The demand for AAA tranches 
was particularly high from financial institutions since regulators required less capital reserves for 
top rated assets. Securitized mortgage instruments fitted perfectly into this framework as these 
institutions could benefit from the attractive yields and the low required capital reserves of these 
assets. This characteristic is particularly evident when comparing the portion of AAA rated tranches 
to the portion of AAA rated corporate bonds, where only approximately 1% are top rated versus 
approximately 94% of privately issued AAA MBS tranches (He et al., 2011). Finally, rating 
agencies received higher fees for assessing structured instruments like CMOs, than for corporate 
bonds due to the complexity of these products, leading to further inventive for to provide top ratings 
on these complex instruments in order to secure future rating mandates for the agencies 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). 
 
 The rating process for structured products like MBS differs from the traditional corporate bonds 
because the issuing firm is not in the focus of the assessment, instead are the “large number of 
credit-sensitive assets” which are pooled and tranched as the underlying of the security. The pool 
of collaterals is separated into prioritized claims, that “absorb losses from the underling portfolio 
following seniority; hence, tranche-level ratings depend both on the risks and diversification from 
the collateral pool as well as on the structuring of the cash flows” (He et al., 2011). According to 
Coval, Jurek, & Stafford (2009), the rating models of the rating agencies used for assessing 
structured financial product like CDOs were not error proof and small and minor imprecisions in 
the assessment parameter would have resulted in significantly different ratings. Another issue 
concerning the credit agencies is, that the rating does not provide “information regarding whether 
the security is particularly likely to default at the same time that there is a large decline in the stock 
market or that the economy is in a recession” (Coval et al., 2009). Since, in particular structured 
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instruments, like CDOs and CMOs, are highly exposed to systematic risk, CMO ratings can be 
considered as obscuring the substantial systematic default risk. Consequently, AAA- rated 
mortgage instruments defaulted and lost significant value during the financial crisis, which casted 
“doubt on the diligence of the rating agencies in inspecting and monitoring the securities, as do the 
incomes the agencies earned by making the ratings” (Johnson & Neave, 2008). Another issue 
reagrding the rating approaches of complex instruments like CMOs was treating the ratings of 
products like CMOs as equivalent to the ratings of conventional fixed income products like 
corporate bonds leading to an apparent comparabilitiy of the the two substantially different types 
of securities. This mechanic created the incentive for investors to not conduct due diligences on 
CDO and CMO investments, but rather to trust the ratings and to compare these complex 
instruments to similarly rated bonds.   
 
 In conclusion, securitized mortgage instruments played a key role during the financial crisis and 
the booming economy and housing market as well as the hunt for short term yields created a 
framework of perverse incentives for all stakeholders to make short term profits at the expense of 
risk assessement. Under these circumstances, complex instruments, like CMOs, were engineered 
and supported by rating agencies as regulators, to profit from the growing subprime mortgage 
market. The substantial systematic risk exposure eventually lead to the unfolding of the financial 
crisis when a larhe number of subprime mortgages defaulted and liquidtity decreased substantially 
leading to a downward spiral in the wider financial markets.   
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3. Data Analysis 
The data analysis section is organized as follows. First, a market analysis is conducted to provide 
an overview about the discussed markets. In the methodology, the portfolio and mean-variance 
theory and mathematics are explained. Subsequently, the model used for the mean-variance 
computations is described as well as the data used for the optimizations. Finally, the portfolio 
optimizations are conducted in the last sub-section of this chapter.  
 
3.1. Market Analysis 
This section will provide an overview about the mortgage market as well as a set of financial assets 
by analyzing market data about the securitized mortgage market, including MBS issuance, the 
performance of the subprime market during the financial crisis, followed by an analysis of the 
CMO market as well the CMBS market. Afterwards, the market for real estate is analyzed, starting 
off with the performance of the REIT market, followed by a comparison between direct and indirect 
real estate and concluding with an analysis of a hypothetical mixed portfolio.  
 
3.1.1. Securitized Mortgage Market 
The market for agency and non-agency MBS experienced a strong growth during the years before 
the financial crisis as displayed in chart 3. Both segments grew from around USD 615 billion in 
2000 to more than USD 2.7 trillion in 2003, at this point, the saturation of the demand for 
conforming mortgages reached high levels, leading to a decline in agency-MBS and a substantial 
growth in the market for non-agency MBS. The market share of non-agency MBS was stable 
between 2000 and 2003 at around 22%, however in 2004 the market share jumped to 46% and 
continued its growth in issuances of 44% which was in line with 2002 and 2003. The agency MBS 
issuances fell by more than 50% in 2004 compared to the previous year and remained at stable 
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levels between 2004 and 2006 at around USD 1 trillion. The non-agency issuance volume 
continued its growth until 2006, reaching a 56% market share with volume of more than USD 1.1 
trillion. At the peak of the financial crisis in 2008, the market for non-agency mortgages nearly 
disappeared with issuances declining by 92% compared to 2007 leading to a market share of 5% 
in 2008 and 4% in 2009 while agency MBS issuances experienced a growth of 48% in 2009 after 
a decline of 7% in 2008. The strong increase observable in 2009, was due to the intervention of the 
US Federal Reserve in January 2009, which decided to start purchasing large amounts of agency 
MBS to be held on its balance sheet as a measure of quantitative easing. Between 2009 and 2013, 
issuance levels were relatively stable, ranging between USD 1.7 trillion and USD 2.1 trillion and 
non-agency MBS issuances had a share between 3% and 6%. The Federal Reserve acquired total 
holdings of approximately USD 1.8 trillion of agency MBS until April 2014 and continued to roll 
over the securities to keep a constant balance at this volume. This indicates, that the Federal reserve 
is a dominant player in the agency MBS market (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2017). The 
federal reserve has decided in 2017 to shrink its balance sheet, to reduce quantitative easing 
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Chart 3: MBS issuance volume, 2000-2006 adopted from Cohen-Cole & Sabry (2014) with data from Inside 
Mortgage Finance and 2007-2016 adopted from SIFMA Securitization Year in Review (2017) 
 
3.1.2. Subprime Market Performance during the Financial Crisis 
As described in section 3.1.1, the subprime mortgage market grew exponentially during the years 
leading to the financial crisis. Due to securitization and financial engineering, complex instruments 
were developed to serve the demand for high yielding subprime mortgage investments. These 
instruments are exposed to significant systematic risks and during the crisis, not only the 
subordinate tranches of subprime instruments, but also the AAA- rated tranches suffered 
substantially and liquidity for these instruments disappeared. Commonly used indices for analyzing 
the subprime market are the ABX indices by Markit. These indices are relatively complex, but offer 
an assessment of the “investors’ perception of the subprime market and their expectations about 
the expected defaults of the underlying mortgage collateral” (Cohen-Cole & Sabry, 2014). In fact, 
the Home equity asset-backed securities index (ABX.HE) gauges the actual and expected default 
risk, possible loss of liquidity as well as substantial changes in the macroeconomic environment 
affecting the respective subprime market segment. The ABX.HE index tracks the performance of 
20 equally weighted sub-indices, which are each “composed of CDSs on tranches of 20 of the 
largest subprime ABS for the relevant time period” (Cohen-Cole & Sabry, 2014). The 20 sub-
indices offer an analysis of segments of the subprime market, hence the different subprime tranches 
ranging from AAA to BBB- can be assessed. There is substantial evidence for an over-estimation 
of the ABX of the effects of the financial crisis on the subprime market due to a limited set of CDS 
in the sub-indices and a significant impact of risk perception as well as illiquidity concerns on the 
index price (Cohen-Cole & Sabry, 2014). Nevertheless, chart 4 displays the ABX.HE index 
consisting of several tranches of ABX credit default swaps issued in July 2006 at par (100% of the 
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asset value). It can be observed, that all tranches remain at par until November 2006, where the 
most subordinate tranches (BBB-) start to decline, followed by the other tranches in order of 
seniority. Interestingly, the AAA tranches only started to decline in July 2007, more than half a year 
after the BBB- tranches did. This indicates the absorption effect created through credit 
enhancement as discussed in section 2.4.3. At the peak of the crisis the BBB-, BBB and A rated 
tranches were only worth a few cents on the dollar, demonstrating the extensive liquidity shock in 
the subprime mortgage market. Even the senior AA rated tranches were only worth around 10 cents 
on the dollar and the top-rated tranches were worth less than 50% of their par value.  
 
Chart 4: ABX.HE 06-02, from Cohen-Cole & Sabry (2014) 
 
3.1.1. Collateralized Mortgage Obligations Market Analysis  
The market for collateralized mortgage obligations behaved similarly to the MBS market, but with 
a sharper decrease in liquidity during the financial crisis. In chart 5, the US issuance volume of 
CMOs between 2001 and 2016, segmented by collateral type, can be observed. There are four 
collateral types analyzed, the three agency- guaranteed mortgage series of Freddie Mae (FHLMC), 
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Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Ginnie Mae (GNMA) as well as Whole loans (Whole), which are CMOs 
that are not backed by agency guaranteed mortgages. In the beginning of the observed period, the 
issuance volumes increased substantially in all observed segments. In particular, the Whole loan 
segment increased strongly. CMOs backed by non-agency loans are generally riskier due to 
underlying mortgages that do not conform with the agency standards and the lack of GSE 
guarantees. Amounting to only 31% of the analyzed CMO issuances in 2001, this segment had a 
share of 71% in 2007, demonstrating the growth of this segment. This observation can be explained 
by the ceasing supply for conforming mortgages and the industry’s growing focus on private label 
mortgages during the years leading to the crisis. After the crash, total CMO issuance volumes 
decreased from over USD 1 trillion in 2005 to USD 191 billion in 2008. As expected, the Whole 
loan segment had the strongest decrease, from USD 700 billion in 2005 to only USD 50 billion in 
2008. CMOs backed by agency mortgage faced only small issuance decreases and they picked up 
during the subsequent years while non-agency loan backed CMOs remained a minor segment, 
similar to the non-agency- MBS market, with only 8 to 10% of total issuance volume between 2011 
and 2014. In contrast to the agency-MBS market, the agency-CMO market could not reach pre-
crisis levels until now.   
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Chart 5:CMO issuance by collateral type, percentage values represent share of Whole segment 
Data retrieved from Bloomberg 
 
3.1.2. Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities Market Analysis 
When analyzing the commercial mortgage backed securities market, a similar behavior compared 
to the RMBS market can be observed. In chart 6, the national volumes in USD billions and 
corresponding capitalization rates between 1995 and 2017 of the major CMBS property types retail, 
multifamily, hospitality and office as well as the yield of the US 10-year government bond yield 
(GT10 Yield) can be observed. The capitalization rates or cap rates refer to the inverse of the price/ 
earnings multiple used in assessing commercial properties. It is calculated as the ratio of property 
operating earnings and the property value (Geltner et al., 2006). A linear relationship can be 
observed between the office, multifamily and retail cap rates to the treasury yield. In fact, the 
respective correlation coefficients of the cap rates to the treasury yield are strong and amount to 
79.21% for retail, 84.88% for multifamily and 77.81% for office. There is evidence, that treasuries 
in addition to credit availability and supply/demand as well as inflation predict cap rates 
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started to grow during the early 2000s. A similar behavior was observed in the RMBS market as 
described above. Strong growth is visible from 2003 until the peak of the financial crisis in Q1 
2007 with a total CMBS volume of USD 54 trillion. The retail and office CMBS segments were 
the largest during this period and a particularly strong increase in office CMBS volumes can be 
observed during 2006. In the aftermath of the financial crisis the CMBS market volume dropped 
by 99.8% between Q1 2007 and Q3 2008, indicating a substantial liquidity squeeze in the CMBS 
market, similar to the subprime RMBS market. All analyzed cap rates decreased until the financial 
crisis in line with the decreasing yield of the risk-free rate (GT10). The retail and multifamily cap 
rates show a similar behavior between 1995 and 2007, decreasing from nearly 10% to 
approximately 6% with a correlation coefficient of 89.5%. The hospitality cap rates show a very 
volatile behavior which may be explained by a lower market volume leading to more noise in the 
cap rate values. After the crisis, market volumes remained low until Q1 2012 were volumes in all 
four segments increased substantially to total volumes of more than USD 30 trillion. Volumes 
continued to grow until now, surpassing the peak volumes of the financial crisis indicating a 
recovery in the CMBS market. Cap rates continued to fall until reaching a plateau around 5.5% for 
retail, office and multifamily cap rates, while hospitality rates remained very volatile. In recent 
years, the volume of multifamily CMBS grew significantly becoming the largest CMBS segment. 
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Chart 6: CMBS market, Data retrieved from Bloomberg 
 
3.1.3. Real Estate Market Analysis 
In this section, the real estate market will be analyzed by first assessing the REIT market by the 
performance of the underlying property types. Subsequently, the market capitalization of the four 
main REIT property types is discussed. The third part of this section compares the performance of 
direct real estate to indirect real estate investments and finally, the performance of the mortgage 
REITs to the securitized mortgage market is analyzed.  
 
3.1.4. Real Estate Investment Trust Market Performance 
In chart 7, the performance of the REIT market by property type is presented over the period 
between 2005 and 2017. The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) 
provides a wide range of REIT indices. The quarterly cumulative return of the NAREIT Total 
Return indices of the different property segments indicate a homogenous behavior during the 
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than 58% between March 2008 and March 2009. The strongest decline during this period can be 
observed with the industrial REITs (-80.1%), followed by REITs focusing on retail properties (-
68.1%). Least affected by the financial crisis were specialty REITs with a decline of 28.3%. During 
the years after the crisis, the REIT indices recovered to a large extend, leading to current levels 
above 2008. This reversal is in line with rallying property prices as well equity levels after the 
financial crisis. Industrial REITs remained volatile and underperformed the other REIT segments 
until 2016. The highest annualized return over the analyzed period is achieved by residential REITs 
(11.72%) and apartment REITs (11.41%), which also have similar standard deviations of around 
24%. This similarity is expected due to similar type of properties. As expected, the industrial REITs 
have the highest standard deviation of 32.77%. A high correlation between the NAREIT segments 
can be observed, with correlation coefficients greater than 79.25% (between industrial and 
apartment REITs). Hence, the NAREIT Total Return sub-indices are highly correlated and the 
apartment and residential REITs appear most attractive from a risk/ return standpoint.   
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3.1.5. Comparison of Direct and Indirect Property Markets 
When comparing the performance of the major indices for direct and the indirect property markets 
during the last 20 years, several key differences can be observed. In chart 8, the cumulative 
quarterly returns of the NAREIT Total Return Index (NAREIT TR) and the National Council of 
Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries Transaction Based Index (NCREIF TBI) are plotted. The 
NCREIF TBI index is based on transactions and is less exposed to valuation smoothing errors as 
other direct property indices. Hence, this index is more volatile than the NCREIF Total Return 
Index. During the late 1990s, the fall of the REIT market can be overserved, which was due to a 
loss in confidence in the REIT sector as described in section 2.3.3. After the dot com crash, REIT 
returns gained until mid-2007 when the financial crisis started to affect the REIT market. Direct 
property returns remained relatively stable in the long term and continuously rose until the property 
prices declined in course of the financial crisis until September 2009. The REIT Index suffered the 
strongest losses between October 2008 and March 2009 of more than 58%, while the NCREIF TR 
Index only lost approximately 28% during the same period. This indicates a decoupling of the REIT 
performance from the underlying direct property performance. A reason for this behavior is the 
higher correlation to wider equity markets of the REIT market, causing more negative effects from 
the crisis. Another reason for the observed underperformance of REITs compared to direct real 
estate investments is the characteristically high leverage ratios of REITs, which lead to increased 
financing costs during the financial crisis, when cost of debt soared. Sun, Titman and Twite (2015) 
analyze the effect of leverage on REIT performance and find evidence for a negative impact of 
high leverage ratios of the firms as well as a negative impact of debt maturing during the crisis. In 
order to pay their debt obligations, REITs had to sell properties during the recession at a discount 
leading to shrinking NAVs and worse performance. Hence, the high debt exposure has amplified 
the effect of the crisis on REITs.  
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Chart 8: NAREIT/ NCREIF performance, Data retrieved from Bloomberg 
 
3.1.6. Performance of a Mixed Portfolio 
A main objective for investors is to diversify their holdings through multiple asset classes. As 
described in section 2.1, the main asset classes are equities, cash and fixed income as financial 
assets as well as direct real estate as a real asset. Chart 9 plots the cumulative quarterly returns 
between 1997 and 2017 of the major indices representing the abovementioned asset classes. 
Equities are represented by the S&P 500 Total Return Index, which includes the 500 largest US 
public companies. Fixed Income is represented by the S&P 500 Investment Grade Corporate Bond 
Total Return Index and the 10-year US Treasury Total Return Index. Securitized mortgage 
instruments as part of the fixed income asset class are represented by the agency MBS Total Return 
Index as well as the CMBS Index. Finally, real estate performance is tracked by the NCREIF Total 
Return and NAREIT Total Return indices. An immediate differentiation between the asset classes, 





















































































































































































































Performance of  direct and indirect property
NAREIT TR NCREIF TBI
                                                                       MBS IN A DIVERSIFIED PORTFOLIO  51 
securities have the least volatile performance and seem to have not been affected much by the 
financial crisis. The two real estate indices on the other hand demonstrate a volatile performance, 
the NAREIT index being significantly more volatile. The REIT market, however suffered 
substantially more from the financial crisis than the private property market. The S&P 500 Index, 
was also more volatile than the fixed income indices and had substantial losses during the crisis. A 
second observation is, that the cumulative returns of the NAREIT Index were the highest reaching 
approximately 225% until the end of 2016 followed by direct property with around 186% and 
stocks with 158%. This analysis indicates that securitized mortgages behaved similarly to 
traditional fixed income securities during the last two decades and may be used as a substitute. 
Additionally, the impressive, but volatile performance of the covered real estate indices indicate, 
that they would be a return enhancing addition to a mixed portfolio. 
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3.2. Methodology 
In this section, the methodology of the mean-variance optimization is described in order to provide 
the theoretical and mathematical background for the portfolio optimization conducted in section 
3.4. First, the basics of the portfolio mathematics are briefly explained, including the diversification 
effect. Subsequently, the mean- variance framework is outlined followed by a description of the 
model used for conducting the optimizations.  
 
3.2.1. Portfolio Mathematics 
The expected return of a mixed- asset portfolio is calculated as the weighted average return of the 
individual assets: 




Equation 1:Portfolio expected return 
where E(R) represents the expected return based on historical data, i refers to one of the m 
individual assets included in the portfolio and w the individual weights. The standard deviation σ 








Equation 2: Standard deviation 
 where N denotes the number of values in the sample, x the individual values and μ the expected 
return. The volatility of a portfolio is not calculated as a weighted average, like the portfolio return, 
but as a weighted average of the variances of the underlying assets plus a covariance component:  
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 σ²P = ∑ w²i
m
i=0






Equation 3: Portfolio volatility 
where  Cov𝑖𝑗 refers to the covariance between assets i and j. The covariance can be calculated by 
multiplying the correlation coefficient between assets i and j with the product of their standard 
deviations. The correlation coefficient ranges between -1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1 
(perfect positive correlation). Extreme correlations rarely exist in reality, since perfect negative or 
positive correlations would indicate either an exact co-movement between assets or a symmetrical 
opposite movement. The lower the correlation coefficient between the assets in the portfolio is 
from +1, the higher is the diversification effect, a portfolio with perfectly positive correlations 
would not achieve any diversification. In order to better understand the diversification effect, a 
hypothetical portfolio of two assets with changing correlations is modeled. Chart 10 plots the 
possible combinations of portfolios consisting of two assets, a hypothetical stock with an expected 
return of 6% and a standard deviation of 20% as well as a hypothetical bond with an expected 
return of 3% and a standard deviation of 10%. The combinations depend on the weights of the 
assets, ranging from 0% to 100% of one asset. The top right corner represents a portfolio only 
consisting of the stock and the bottom left corner a portfolio fully invested in the bond. Five 
different correlation coefficients (ρ) between the two assets are modelled in order to demonstrate 
the diversification effect. A correlation coefficient of 1 between the two assets leads to no 
diversification effects, indicated by the straight line. With decreasing correlation coefficients, the 
leftmost point of the plotted frontier decreases in standard deviation, reaching its maximum 
diversification potential with a correlation coefficient of -1. Thus, by combining assets, which are 
not perfectly correlated, more attractive risk/ return characteristics can be achieved, since portfolios 
with less risk at a similar expected return can be built than by only investing in one asset. The 
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diversification effect demonstrates the interest of investors to invest in assets, which are not highly 
correlated to achieve portfolios with higher returns and lower volatility.  
 
Chart 10: Portfolio combinations of two assets with varying correlations 
 
3.2.2. The Concept of Mean-Variance Optimization  
When optimizing portfolio allocations under the mean-variance framework, the concept of the 
capital allocation line (CAL) is essential for analyzing possible portfolio compositions. The CAL 
represents the opportunity set for an investor when investing in a risky and a risk-free asset. It plots 
the combinations of these two assets depending on their risk and return characteristics. Hence, the 
slope of the CAL is the reward- to- volatility ratio, also referred to as Sharpe Ratio (Bodie et al., 
2014). The CAL is a straight line originating from the y-axis, at the risk-free rate of return (point 
Rf), until the point representing the risk/ return combination of the risky asset (point P). If an 
investor decides to have an equal investment in the risk- free and the risky asset, the chosen 
portfolio would be in the middle between the points Rf and P. The investor may also decide to 
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CAL to the right of point P. The investor can invest in a set of possible risky portfolios, depending 
on the combinations and weights of the underlying assets. When plotting the points of all possible 
combinations of portfolios, an area is created representing the portfolios. The border of this area is 
referred to as the efficient frontier, which marks all portfolios with the highest level of return at a 
given level of volatility. Portfolios, that lie inside the efficient frontier are not efficient and less 
attractive to an investor.  
 
In the mean-variance framework, two efficient portfolios are commonly calculated which represent 
the most attractive portfolios consisting of a chosen set of assets. The first portfolio is the minimum- 
variance portfolio or global minimum- variance portfolio (GMV). This portfolio calculates the 
combination of risky assets that minimizes the variance of the portfolio regardless of expected 
return. In fact, the standard deviation of the GMV portfolio is always lower than the lowest standard 
deviation of any of the underlying assets due to the diversification effect. Hence, when plotting the 
efficient frontier, the GMV is leftmost point on the frontier (Campbell & Viceira, 2005). When 
analyzing a portfolio of two risky assets, the weight of the first asset (x) of the GMV portfolio can 
be calculated with the following formula:  




y − 2 ∗ σxy
 
Equation 4: GMV portfolio weights 
where σ denotes the standard deviation of the respective assets and σxy the covariance between 
assets x and y. The weight of the second asset is calculated by Wy = 1 – Wx. The second portfolio 
is the tangency portfolio, which calculates the portfolio with the highest Sharpe Ratio given the 
underlying assets. The tangency portfolio has the highest slope of the CAL and thus a tangency 
point between the CAL and the efficient frontier. Hence, the tangency portfolio provides the highest 
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level of excess return per unit of risk. In a two-asset environment, the formula for calculating the 
weight of the first risky asset (x) in the tangency portfolio is:  
Wx =  
(μx − Rf)σ
2
y − (μy − Rf)σxy
(μx − Rf)σ
2
y + (μy − Rf)σ
2
x − (μx − Rf + μy − Rf)σxy
 
Equation 5: Tangency portfolio weights 
Where µ denotes the expected return of the respective asset, Rf the risk-free rate, σ the respective 
standard deviation and σxy the covariance between assets x and y. The weight of the second asset is 
calculated by Wy = 1 – Wx. For calculating the tangency portfolio of a combination of more than 
two assets, spreadsheet calculations are required. In this study, optimizations are conducted using 
the solver add-in in excel, which allows for adjusting the optimization for certain constraints as 
discussed in the end of this section.  
 
Since not all investors have the same level of risk aversion, an investor may decide to invest only 
part of his or her wealth into the previously calculated tangency portfolio and the remainder in the 
risk- free asset. Such a portfolio, consisting of the tangency portfolio and a risk- free asset, is called 
the optimal complete portfolio. This portfolio can be calculated by adding a risk aversion 
coefficient (λ) to the Sharpe Ratio formula to calculate the weight of the tangency portfolio in the 





Equation 6:Optimal complete portfolio weights 
The risk aversion coefficient ranges between 1 and 5 indicating a higher risk aversion, the higher 
the coefficient. Thus, a more risk averse investor would calculate a lower weight for tangency 
portfolio and invest the remainder in the risk-free asset. This optimal complete portfolio will still 
have the same Sharpe Ratio, since it lies on the CAL. Chart 11 plots the efficient frontier, the CAL 
                                                                       MBS IN A DIVERSIFIED PORTFOLIO  57 
and the tangency portfolio of the hypothetical portfolio described above consisting of a stock and 
a bond with a correlation coefficient of 10%.  
 
Chart 11: Efficient frontier, CAL, minimum-variance and tangency portfolio  
Adopted from Bodie et. al. (2014) 
 
3.2.3. The Portfolio Optimization Model  
This study analyzes a portfolio of more than two assets, which requires the use of a spreadsheet to 
calculate the efficient frontier, the GMV portfolio as well as the tangency portfolio. An excel model 
was developed to calculate the weights of the tangency and the GMV portfolio and plotting the 
efficient frontier corresponding to a set of 20 target returns (Annex 1 and 2). The model includes a 
selected set of indices, for which minimum and maximum weight constraints can be set. According 
to Lee and Stevenson (2005), these weight constraints offer the benefit of restricting extreme 
allocations as well as promoting the “spirit of diversification” since more assets are included. 
Returns, cumulative returns as well as descriptive statistics are computed for the chosen set of 
indices. A detailed description and descriptive analysis of the assessed indices follows in the 
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computes the variances among the selected indices, which is used for the matrix calculus conducted 
for calculating the portfolio standard deviations and returns. The solver subsequently optimizes the 
set of indices for the tangency, the GMV as well as the target returns of the efficient frontier. Criteria 
in addition to minimum and maximum weights are necessary for an accurate optimization process, 
namely a constraint, that the sum of weights sums to 100%, so that the portfolio is fully invested 
and that no negative weights are allowed. Restricting negative weights corresponds to the short 
selling restriction, which is common when performing mean- variance optimizations on realistic 
investment portfolios. The described restrictions and constraints on the asset allocations mitigates 
some of the shortcomings of the mean-variance optimizations since less extreme and more realistic 
portfolios are calculated that would be more in line with allocation requirements of investors. 
Finally, the computed weights of the tangency and the minimum variance portfolio are used to 
calculate descriptive statistics as well as cumulative returns of the respective portfolios. 
Furthermore, an equally weighted portfolio is generated to compare the performance of the 
computed efficient portfolios with a conventional portfolio choice. as well as a risk parity portfolio, 
which represent common asset allocation techniques used by professional investors. The risk parity 
portfolio is created by calculating the 20-period rolling standard deviations of the underlying 
indices. Subsequently, the respective rolling standard deviations of the individual assets in the 
period is divided by the sum of standard deviations in that period, which calculates the risk parity 
weight of that asset for the subsequent period. Finally, the returns of the risk parity portfolio are 
calculated by adding the product of the weights and returns of the analyzed assets in the respective 
periods. Hence, the risk parity portfolio distributes the portfolio volatility equally among the asset 
classes.  
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3.2.4. Data 
For the portfolio optimization of this study, a hypothetical portfolio containing the asset classes 
equities, fixed income, mortgages and real estate is chosen. Such a portfolio represents a mixed 
portfolio with multiple asset classes that provide diversification benefits. The asset classes are 
represented by indices focused on the US market.  
 
Quarterly data for the following ten indices were downloaded from the Bloomberg Terminal for 
the sample period between March 1999 and December 2016 and categorized into asset classes to 
be analyzed in the mean-variance framework. The majority of the selected indices are total return 
indices, which reinvest the cash flows received into the index and thus better represent investment 
into the respective asset classes. The first asset class are equities, for which the S&P 500 Total 
Return Index (SPXT Index) is chosen. The second asset class are bonds, which include the 
Bloomberg Barclays US Government 10 Year Term Index Total Return (BCEY4T Index), which 
represents an investment into US Treasury bills with a 10-year term. Secondly, the S&P 500 
Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index Total Return (SP5IGBIT Index) is selected as an 
investment into low default risk corporate bonds. In addition to these conventional fixed income 
investments, indices for the securitized mortgage market are chosen. These include the Bloomberg 
Barclays US Mortgage Backed Securities Index (LUMSTRUU Index), which tracks the 
performance of agency MBS pass-through securities guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and 
Freddie Mac. Next the Bank of America (BofA) Merrill Lynch US fixed Rate CMBS Index is 
included to represent investments in to the commercial mortgage backed securities. Furthermore, 
the following structured securities are included, the BofA Merrill Lynch US Agency CMO Index 
(CMOS Index), which consists of agency-MBS pass through securities; and the BofA Merrill 
Lynch 10+ Year US Agency CMO Z-Tranche Index (CM9Z Index), which is a sub-index of the 
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CMOS Index, representing exposure to the subordinate Z-tranche. The third asset class relates to 
real estate, as the public real estate investment vehicle, the FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITS Total 
Return Index (FNERTR Index) is selected, which includes all tax qualified REITs listed in the US. 
Additionally, the FTSE NAREIT Mortgage REIT Total Return Index (FNERTR Index) is included 
as exposure to the mortgage REIT market. Furthermore, the NCREIF Transaction Based Index 
(NPPINTBI Index) represents the private real estate market. This index tracks the income as well 
as appreciation at the property level, thus excluding leverage effects, of various commercial 
property types. The index differs from the basic NCREIF property index as it is based on 
transactions instead of appraisals. Hence, this index controls for issues like appraisal smoothing 
and is a superior index for assessing the return characteristics of direct real estate. NCREIF indices 
are a limiting factor for analyzing returns, as this index is only published quarterly, while daily data 
is available for the remaining indices. Hence samples sizes decrease significantly when including 
direct property investments. Finally, in order to calculate excess returns, the US Generic 
Government 3 Month Yield Index (USGG3M Index) is chosen as the risk-free rate.  
 
3.3. Descriptive Analysis  
Descriptive statistics mean to provide an overview about the return characteristics of the selected 
indices. In the table 1, descriptive statistics of the described data, over the sample period March 
1999 to December 2016, can be observed. The highest annualized return over the period is achieved 
by the equity REIT index with 13.27%, followed by the mortgage REITs (9.05%) and the SPTX 
(6.40%), while the lowest return is unsurprisingly generated by the risk-free asset, the short-term 
treasury bill with 1.78%. This rate is used as the risk-free rate and applied for Sharpe Ratio 
calculations. The risk-free rate has also the lowest annualized volatility with 1.01%, followed by 
the NCREIF TBI index with 2.49%. The equity REIT index is the most volatile of the selected 
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indices with 21.26% standard deviation. The substantial difference in risk/return characteristics 
between the public and private real estate vehicles may hint at stronger similarities of the REITs to 
the wider stock market than to the private property market.  Additionally, the difference may be 
caused by a difference in property types and the potentially riskier real estate investment strategy 
employed by the REIT managers versus the NCREIF index which focuses on stabilized properties 
in prime markets. The agency MBS index achieves the highest Sharpe Ratio with 1.13, followed 
by the CMO index with 1.10. This indicates a strong risk adjusted outperformance of the MBS and 
CMO markets during the observed period. Due to the essentially similar nature of the MBS and the 
CMO index explain the similar risk/ return characteristics. Another important measure for 
analyzing the returns of an index are skewness and kurtosis. Skewness measures the symmetry of 
the distribution of returns. The skewness is calculated by the average of the ratio of cubed 
deviations from the mean of the observed returns and the cubed standard deviations. Hence, this 
measure is also referred to as the third moment. If a distribution has a skewness of zero, the 
distribution is symmetrical around the mean, while a negative value indicates a distribution skewed 
to the left of the mean and the opposite is true of for a positive skewness. The skew of the indices 
to be optimized ranges between 0.59 (10- year treasuries) and -1.02 (equity REITs) except for the 
outlier Z-tranche CMO index with a slew of -2.99. The strong negative skew of the Z-tranche CMO 
index indicates, that the standard deviation underestimates the risk of the distribution significantly 
due to high negative extreme values. This is expected due to the high losses during the financial 
crisis which particularly affected the riskiest CMO tranches. Kurtosis is a measure indicating the 
probability for extreme values in the distribution. Hence, a distribution with fat tales has a higher 
occurrence of extreme values than a distribution with narrow tales and less values lie around the 
mean (Bodie et al., 2014). The kurtosis is calculated similar to the skewness, but to the fourth power, 
this measure is thus known as the fourth moment. A normal distribution has a kurtosis of 3, thus 3 
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is deducted in order to indicate the deviation from a normal distribution. Distributions with a 
kurtosis above the 3 of the normal distribution are considered as fat-tailed. The Z-Tranche index 
also has in this measure the highest value with 18.10, indicating extremely fat tales with a high 
probability of extreme values. In combination with the strong negative skewness, the analysis of 
the third and the fourth moment indicates a high probability of highly negative returns. Other 
indices with fat tales are the CMBS index (7.04), the equity REIT index (4.59) and the private real 











SPXT  S&P 500 TR 6.40% 16.31% 0.283 1.005  (0.61)  0.30  
FNERTR  Equity REIT 13.27% 21.26% 0.540 0.853  (1.02)  4.59  
FNMRTR  Mortgage 
REIT 
9.05% 23.42% 0.310 0.443  (0.43)  0.62  
CM9Z  Z-tranche 
CMO 
6.28% 14.10% 0.319 -0.283  (2.99)  18.10  
LUMSTRUU  Agency MBS 4.85% 2.71% 1.131 -0.088  0.12   (0.07) 
BCEY4T  Treasuries 5.69% 7.44% 0.525 -0.279  0.59   0.51  
CMOS CMO 5.09% 3.00% 1.101 -0.106  0.15   (0.23) 
CMBS  CMBS 5.77% 6.88% 0.580 0.107  (0.34)  7.04  
SP5IGBIT  Corp. Bonds 5.50% 5.14% 0.723 -0.007  (0.41)  2.15  
NPPINTBI  Private Prop. 2.39% 2.49% 0.243 0.003  (0.28)  3.70  
USGG3M  Risk-free 1.78% 1.01% 0.000 -0.010  0.81   (0.87) 
 Table 1:Descriptive Statistics of Indices 
In addition to the descriptive statistics, the correlations between the indices are informative to make 
inferences about diversification effects. Table 2 displays the correlation matrix including p-values 
for significance levels between the 10 indices calculated in Stata. The p-values can be observed 
below the respective correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficients measure the level of co-
movement between two series. The p-value represents the result of a hypothesis test, whether the 
respective correlation coefficient is statistically significant. For example, a significance level of 
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0.05 (5%) or less indicates that the respective coefficient is statistically significant at a confidence 
level of 95%.  
 
The correlation matrix confirms the expectations gathered in the literature review, as the wider 
stock market is moderately correlated to the equity REITs with a coefficient of 0.65 and a weak 
correlation to mortgage REITs. This indicates a connection of the REIT indices to the wider stock 
market during the observed period. The remaining indices have weak and moderately negative 
linear relationships to the equity index despite CMBS (0.25) and corporate bonds and private real 
estate have statistically significant linear relationship to equities. Strong negative correlations to 
equities are found for treasuries (0.61) CMOs (-0.57) and MBS (-0.53). It can be concluded, that 
the securitized mortgage instruments have a negative relationship to equities and would offer strong 
diversification benefits when including the instruments into a portfolio with equities. The highest 
correlation coefficient when analyzing all coefficients can be observed between agency MBS and 
the agency CMO index with 0.94, which is close to a perfectly positive linear relationship. This 
can be expected by similar type of collateral of these instruments. Additionally, the agency MBS 
are strongly correlated to the fixed income indices treasuries (0.82) and corporate bonds (0.59) 
demonstrating statistically significant similarities of the securitized mortgage market to the fixed 
income market. The relatively high correlation among the three major fixed income instruments, 
the agency MBS, the treasury and the corporate bond index, indicates little diversification benefit 
among the fixed income assets. Notably, the coefficients of both MBS and CMO indices to the 
treasuries and corporate bond indices are higher than to the Z-tranche index. This may indicate, 
that the MBS and CMOs may behave more similar to treasuries and corporate bonds than to the 
risky tranches created through excessive securitization, although essentially being backed by a 
similar type of collateral. While the correlations of CMBS are statistically significant and 
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moderately strong to REITs, the correlation coefficients of the MBS and CMO indices to both, the 
REIT index and the direct property index, are close to zero and not statistically significant. This 
indicates possible diversification benefits of a portfolio including agency- mortgage instruments 
and commercial property investments. As expected, commercial mortgages in combination with 
commercial real estate is not beneficial from a diversification perspective. It is interesting to 
mention, that no correlation coefficient to the private real estate index is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. Hence, there is no significant evidence for a linear relationship of the indices to 
direct real estate. This indicates attractive diversification benefits of direct real estate, which is in 






















         
           
FNERTR 0.65 1.00 
        
 
0.00 
         
FNMRTR 0.31 0.49 1.00 
       
 
0.01 0.00 
        
CM9Z -0.32 -0.09 0.13 1.00 
      
 
0.01 0.45 0.30 
       
MBS -0.53 -0.09 0.13 0.57 1.00 
     
 
0.00 0.46 0.28 0.00 
      
BCEY4T -0.61 -0.23 0.01 0.61 0.82 1.00 
    
 
0.00 0.06 0.90 0.00 0.00 
     
CMOS -0.57 -0.11 0.10 0.59 0.94 0.85 1.00 
   
 
0.00 0.36 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
CMBS 0.25 0.60 0.35 0.30 0.27 0.10 0.29 1.00 
  
 
0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.38 0.01 
   
SP5IGBIT -0.02 0.22 0.38 0.52 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.56 1.00 
 
 
0.86 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
NPPINTBI -0.04 0.02 -0.17 -0.01 -0.09 0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.02 1.00  
0.77 0.88 0.17 0.92 0.45 0.56 0.99 0.41 0.88 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix with significance levels below coefficients 
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3.4. Mean- Variance Optimization 
In the following section, the previously described indices are analyzed under the mean-variance 
framework. First, all ten indices are analyzed to discover the most attractive indices to be included 
in a diversified portfolio. Subsequently, several scenarios are created using the asset classes equities, 
bonds, mortgages as well as real estate and their performance is analyzed in detail. Transaction 
costs are to be ignored for the purpose of this study, but would occur in reality, in particular due to 
frequent portfolio rebalancing.  
 
3.4.1. Portfolio Optimization Including all Indices 
First, a portfolio optimization is conducted using all ten indices described above in order to identify 
allocation patterns. When conducting the optimization for the entire sample period without using 
weight constraints except for no negative weights, a tangency portfolio with a strong bias towards 
securitized agency mortgages is calculated. The tangency portfolio has 49% weight in the agency 
CMO index, 24% in the agency MBS index, 18% in the NCREIF TBI index and the remaining 9% 
in the equity index. Hence, the tangency portfolio, excludes the treasuries and corporate bond 
indices as well as the REITs. The minimum-variance portfolio has an allocation to the same four 
indices with direct real estate for 42%, agency MBS for 35%, CMOs for 17% and equities for 6%. 
The Sharpe Ratio of the tangency portfolio amounts to 1.43 and the percentage of positive days 
amounts to 85.5%. In chart 12, the efficient portfolios are displayed according to the 20 target 
returns. It can be observed that at low volatility levels, the NCREIF TBI index is dominant, 
subsequently the efficient portfolios have a stronger bias towards the CMO and the agency MBS 
index at returns. At return ranges between 7% and 10% the treasury index has a significant 
allocation and at the highest target return levels the NAREIT equity REIT index dominates the 
allocations due to the high return throughout the sample period. This confirms the results of 
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Brounen, Prado and Verbeek (2010) for higher allocations to indirect real estate in risk tolerant 
efficient portfolios at the expense of direct real estate.  
 
Chart 12: Allocations in efficient portfolios along target returns 
In order to assess whether the strong bias towards securitized agency mortgages persists when 
shortening the sample period, the resulting tangency portfolios are calculated. Chart 13 displays 
the allocations in the tangency portfolios of sample periods starting in end of March of the years 
1999 to 2010 and ranging till end 2016. Several observations can be made when analyzing the 
resulting tangency portfolios. First, it can be observed, that tangency allocations only consist of the 
equity index (SPTX), the agency MBS index (LUMSTRUU), the CMO index (CMOS) and the 
private real estate index (NPPINTBI). Hence, in the optimal portfolios, the securitized agency 
mortgages fully substitute the traditional fixed income asset class. Secondly, the allocation to 
securitized agency mortgages (LUMSTRUU and CMOS indices) is relatively stable at between 
65% and 70% until the sample start in 2008. Besides, the weight of the CMO index is larger than 
the weight of the agency MBS index during all sample ranges, signifying that the CMOs offer 
greater diversification benefits since the agency MBS index has a slightly higher Sharpe Ratio. 
SPXT Index FNERTR Index
CM9Z Index
LUMSTRUU Index 


















Allocations in efficient portfolios
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This indicates that the bias towards these assets persists throughout the sample ranges until the 
financial crisis. In line with the findings of Brounen, Prado and Verbeek (2010), allocations to 
direct real estate range between 20% and 25% in the tangency portfolios, despite the samples 
starting in 2009 and 2010. In fact, in the sample ranges starting in 2009 and 2010, the optimal 
allocations gain bias towards private real estate with a 41% and 47% weight respectively in the 
resulting tangency portfolios at the expense of the MBS index which is excluded. The sample 
periods that exclude the financial crisis have tangency portfolios with a clear bias towards direct 
real state and CMOs indicating that the agency MBS segment performed particularly well during 
the crisis and direct property underperformed in comparison.  
 
Chart 13: Tangency portfolio weights of samples with different starting points 
This analysis confirmed the expectation from the descriptive analysis, that securitized agency 
mortgages offer both strong diversification potential and have attractive risk/ return attributes. 
However, in order to calculate weights of optimal allocations in a realistic portfolio that includes 
the asset classes equities, bonds and real estate, optimizations on several portfolio combinations 
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Tangency portfolio weights
SPXT Index LUMSTRUU Index CMOS Index NPPINTBI Index
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3.4.2. Scenario Analysis 
In this section, portfolio optimizations will be conducted with different portfolio constellations in 
order to represent different asset mixes. However, the general mix of asset classes, stocks, bonds 
and mortgages as well as real estate are to be maintained. From the previous descriptive and mean- 
variance analysis, high allocations of the MBS and the CMO indices in the tangency portfolio are 
expected due to the high Sharpe Ratios of 1.13 and 1.10 respectively. Since the focus of the 
tangency portfolio calculation is the maximization of the portfolio Sharpe Ratio, these indices are 
expected to be prioritized due to their Sharpe Ratios and diversification capabilities. From the 
portfolio optimizations in the previous section, strong evidence was found for optimal portfolios 
with allocations to the equity index of around 10%, the private property index around 20% and the 
remainder in either the agency MBS index or the CMO index. Allocations to the CMBS, CMO Z-
tranche and mortgage REITs are not expected due to the findings of the previous section and will 
thus be excluded from the following analysis.  
 
From the optimization conducted in the previous section, securitized mortgages and direct real 
estate appeared most attractive for a mean-variance optimization. Hence, the first scenario analyses 
the allocations of a portfolio consisting of the equity index, the treasury bond index, the agency 
MBS index and the direct real estate index. First, optimal allocations are calculated throughout the 
entire sample period,  ranging from December 1999 to December 2016 and no weight constraints 
are set. Setting no minimum or maximum weight constraints entails the risk of excluding an asset 
class due to unfavorable characteristics under the mean-variance framework. The calculated 
allocation has a strong overweight in the agency MBS index with 75%, completely replacing the 
treasuries index and allocating the remainder to private real estate (17%) and equities (8%). The 
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overweight in the MBS index can be explained by attractive diversification effects and the 
minimum variance portfolio splits the majority of allocation between the agency MBS (52%) and 
private real estate treasuries (42%) with the remainder in equities (6%). Hence in the scenario, the 
treasuries index was excluded in both the GMV and the tangency portfolio. The tangency portfolio 
achieves an impressive Sharpe Ratio of 1.38 with a return of 4.26% and a standard deviation of 
1.79%. Since the over-weighted MBS index has a Sharpe Ratio of 1.10, the difference to the 
tangency portfolio Sharpe Ratio can be attributed to diversification effects. The tangency portfolio 
significantly outperforms the calculated equally weighted portfolio, which achieves a Sharpe Ratio 
of 0.85. Moreover, the equally weighted portfolio is not efficient and has a 26 basis point higher 
return than the tangency portfolio at the expense of a much higher standard deviation of 3.23%. 
Chart 14 plots the efficient frontier and the tangency, the minimum variance as well as the equally 
weighted portfolio.   
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This portfolio would not meet the requirements of a typical investor to invest in a mixed portfolio 
including fixed income and equity. Thus, a portfolio optimization with the same set of indices is 
conducted using weight constraints. In order to model the allocation behavior of the MBS index of 
portfolios with varying biases towards either real estate or equities, multiple optimizations are 
conducted using different minimum weights in the equity and real estate sector. When placing 
minimum weights on all four included indices, the allocation continues to be biased towards the 
MBS index with 65%. When increasing the weight of the equity index, the MBS allocation 
decreases in line with an increase in allocation to the treasury bills. For example, at equity weights 
of 20%, 30% and 40%, the agency MBS index has weights of 51%, 15% and 0% respectively. 
Instead, the remaining weights are allocated to treasuries. This shows a clear inverse relationship 
and indicates better diversification benefits between equities and treasuries, than equities and 
agency MBS. When conducting the same experiment, but increasing the weights of the direct real 
estate index, the opposite allocation behavior can be observed. With increases in the weight of 
direct real estate, the weight of the agency MBS index maintains the respective maximum weights, 
while treasuries and equity weights maintain their minimum weights of 10%. This indicates 
diversification benefits between agency MBS and direct real estate. A similar behavior can be 
observed when exchanging the agency-MBS index with the CMO index. Hence, the MBS and 
CMO index are interchangeable since similar allocation behavior was found in this analysis as well 
as the optimizations conducted in the previous section. For the calculation of an optimized portfolio 
with a realistic asset mix of equities, treasuries, agency-MBS and direct properties indices, 
minimum weights of 15% are set for all asset classes, as well as a maximum weight constraint on 
the MBS index of 40% to limit excessive weights on this index. As expected, the resulting tangency 
portfolio utilizes the maximum weight for the MBS index of 40%, 24% is allocated to the direct 
property index, 21% to the treasuries index and the minimum weight of 15% to the equities index. 
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The return statistics of this portfolio are inferior compared to those from the unconstrained portfolio 
with Sharpe Ratio of 1.27 compared to the previous 1.38. However, this portfolio continues to 
outperform the equal weighted and the risk parity portfolios with Sharpe Ratios of 0.85 and 0.71 
respectively. It is to be mentioned, that the return statistics of the risk parity portfolio have a smaller 
sample, starting in end of March 2004, due to the rolling standard deviation calculations. The 
cumulative performance of the tangency, equal-weight and risk-parity portfolio between end of 
March 2004 and end December 2016 can be observed in chart 15. It can be observed that the risk-
parity portfolio, which distributes the volatility evenly among the included indices, is substantially 
more volatile than the other portfolios. In fact, the standard deviation of the risk-parity portfolio 
amounts to 6.60%, versus 2.28% for the tangency and 3.23% for the equally weighted portfolio. 
This can be explained by the high exposure to equities of this index, since the average allocation 
to the equity index in the risk-parity portfolio amounts to 56%. Furthermore, a steep decline in 
course of the financial crisis can be observed, while the tangency portfolio only declines marginally. 
The total return for an investor would be the highest in the risk-parity portfolio with a return of 
91% over the analyzed period compared to the 64% of the equally weighted and 58% of the 
tangency portfolio. However, a substantially higher volatility needs to be accepted, which reduces 
the Sharpe Ratio as described above.  
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Chart 15: Cumulative performance of tangency portfolio, equally weighted portfolio and risk-parity 
portfolio 
 In the second scenario, the NCREIF private real estate index is exchanged with the NAREIT equity 
index to assess a possible change in optimal allocation. The tangency portfolio of this set of indices 
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the equity index. The Sharpe Ratio of this portfolio amounts to 1.36 and is thus higher than the 
unconstrained portfolio of scenario one. When conducting a similar analysis like in scenario one, 
a different allocation behavior of securitized mortgages is observable in a portfolio with REITs 
instead of direct real estate. Similar to the previous analysis, when increasing the weight of the 
equity index, the weight of the treasuries increases at the expense of the agency- MBS index. 
However, when increasing the weight of the REIT index, a similar observation can be made. With 
increasing REIT allocation, the higher the treasury weight and the lower the MBS weight. This 
observation confirms the findings of the correlation analysis, that the REIT index behaves more 
similar to equities, and has strong diversification benefits in a portfolio combined with treasuries 
due to a correlation coefficient of -0.23. However, when forcing constraints in terms of minimum 
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asset mix and exposure to the equity market, the addition of REITs provides less diversification 
benefits than the addition of direct real estate in a mixed portfolio of equities, fixed income and 
MBS. Thus, a constrained version of the portfolio in scenario one is preferable compared to the 
portfolio of scenario two.  
 
4. Results and Interpretation 
The mean-variance analysis found substantial evidence for a significant role of securitized agency 
mortgages in a diversified portfolio. The descriptive analysis found that the return characteristics 
of mortgages during the last 18 years are more similar to the those of conventional fixed income 
securities like treasury bonds and corporate bonds than to real estate investment vehicles. This is 
expected, since mortgage backed securities are categorized as fixed income securities. Moreover, 
the securitized mortgage instruments, agency-MBS and agency-CMO indices, achieve the highest 
Sharpe Ratios of the analyzed indices. The correlation statistics provided an insight into 
diversification potentials of the of different securities. It was found that, securitized mortgages have 
a moderate negative correlation to equities and a weak negative correlation to real estate, while 
having a strong positive correlation to treasuries and corporate bonds. This indication of possible 
diversification benefits between securitized mortgages and equities as well as real estate could be 
confirmed in the mean-variance optimization. The mean-variance analysis found securitized 
agency mortgage instruments to be overweighed consistently in optimal portfolios with weights in 
excess of 70% for the entire sample. Additionally, the minimum-variance portfolios are 
overweighed in securitized agency mortgages. However, other securitized mortgage instruments 
were excluded in the tangency portfolios, like the agency-CMO Z-tranche index and the CMBS 
index as these securities provided less attractive risk/ return attributes and diversification benefits. 
Additionally, the unattractive skewness and kurtosis statistics of the agency-CMO Z-tranche index 
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and the CMBS index create further risk due to extremely fat tales with a high probability of extreme 
values. The allocations to agency MBS and agency CMOs were on similar levels, however weights 
of the CMO index were a few percentage points higher than of the MBS index. These observations 
could be confirmed when shortening the sample size by delaying the sample start. The high 
allocations to securitized mortgages indicate the attractiveness of securitized mortgage instruments 
in the mean-variance framework. Although both instruments contain agency- guaranteed 
conforming mortgages as collateral, structured finance instruments like CMOs are more complex 
and exposed to higher systematic risk than MBS, as indicated in the study of Coval et al.(2009). 
However, investments in to special tranches of agency-CMOs, that offer additional protection 
against changing interest rate environment may be of particular interest in the currently changing 
interest rate environment. Since securitized agency mortgages focus on a very narrow type of 
property as collateral, namely owner- occupied housing, the private real estate, represented by the 
NCREIF transaction based index are a viable addition to a diversified portfolio, as both, residential 
as well as commercial properties are included in this index. However, the superior diversification 
benefits that direct real estate provides should be evaluated against the discussed drawbacks of this 
asset class in terms of lower liquidity, higher transaction costs and higher capital requirements due 
to indivisibility of direct property investments. Thus, a portfolio resembling the property mix of 
the NCREIF index may be impossible to replicate. Even if a replication of the portfolio tracked by 
NCREIF was possible, the discussed information inefficiency of direct real estate may cause a 
substantially different risk and return patterns than those analyzed. This may lead to different 
portfolio allocation in the mean-variance framework.  
 
Finally, the analysis found evidence for substantial diversification benefits between direct 
commercial real estate investments and securitized agency mortgages. When analyzing the drivers 
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of the agency- mortgages and commercial properties, the following inferences can be made. 
Commercial property yields appear to be strongly correlated to the 10-year treasury yield as found 
in section 3.1.2 with coefficients of 0.79 for retail, 0.85 for multifamily and 0.78 for office 
properties during the analyzed period. Increasing treasury yields lead to a decrease in the spread 
between the safe treasury bond yield and alternatives like real estate, causing the demand to decline. 
However, studies found evidence for a questionable relationship of commercial property 
capitalization rates and the 10-year treasury yield. There is evidence for strongly time-varying 
correlations between the two rates as well as other factors affecting capitalization rates like credit 
availability and supply and demand for commercial properties (Mouchakkaa, 2015). Nevertheless, 
commercial rent increases are usually tied to a benchmark, like the consumer price index, which 
itself depends on the performance of the economy and thus, to the treasury yields. This also 
indicates a linear positive relationship of capitalization rates to treasury yields. Since the value of 
commercial properties depends on the expected future cash flows, the discount rate is a key driver 
for property values. The discount rate is linked to the capitalization rate as is the inverse of the 
price/ earnings multiple used in assessing commercial properties. This concludes an inverse 
relationship between property values and capitalization rates. In section 3.3, evidence was found 
for this inverse relationship with a correlation coefficient between equity REITs and treasuries of -
0.23, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. When assessing the mechanics of the 
mortgage market, in contrast to commercial real estate, the appreciation of the security plays a 
subordinate role, as the interest income is the key value driver for MBS. Hence, the spread to 
treasury yields plays an inferior role compared to real estate. Instead, the focus lies on the coupons 
of the mortgages, which depend on the treasury yield, indicated with the strong correlations 
between agency mortgages and treasury bonds in section 3.3. However, the prepayment and 
extension risk of MBS creates the convexity mechanic, causing weaker price appreciation during 
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low interest rates due to prepayments and strong depreciation at high interest rates due to extension 
and duration effects. In conclusion, the diversification effects observed between commercial real 
estate and securitized mortgages may result from a contrary relationship to treasuries, however 
there are multiple factors confirming as well as contradicting this behavior. An empirical analysis 
of this characteristic is out of the scope of this study, but would provide an interesting insight of 
this observed relationship.  
 
5. Conclusion and Limitations 
This study provided valuable insight into the role of securitized mortgages in a diversified portfolio. 
In the literature review, first the concept of the mean-variance framework was discussed, focusing 
on theoretical implications of the diversification effect and the most important limitations of this 
framework, like time-varying correlations as well as excessive weight allocation and the resulting 
exclusion of other assets. Within the analysis of asset classes, particular focus was set on the 
differences between direct and indirect real estate and the respective advantages in terms of 
increased liquidity, diversification potential, information efficiency and lower minimum capital 
requirements for REITs compared to attractive tax write offs and potential independence from 
financial markets. Studies confirmed substantial diversification benefits of private real estate, 
however correlations increased during the financial crisis, decreasing insulation from losses due to 
market crashes through real estate. The next section discussed mortgage backed securities and 
highlighted the differences between agency-MBS, non-agency MBS and CMBS in terms of default 
risk exposure and prepayment characteristics. Moreover, a comparison between MBS and fixed 
income securities like bonds was provided, stressing, that both instruments have an exposure to 
interest rate risk, but bond’s key pricing determent is default risk, while agency-MBS are only 
affected by prepayment and extension risk. Subsequently, an overview about structured mortgage 
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instruments, like CMOs, was provided, which offer the possibility of creating attractive income 
characteristics through the tranching of MBS cash flows according to investor preferences. In 
particular the non-agency CMOs contain substantial degrees of systematic risk and contributed 
significantly to the subprime crisis. In the context of the financial crisis, the incentives and practices 
of the key stakeholder were discussed, which created perverse incentives to take advantage of 
short-term gains without taking increased risk measures into consideration. This spiral of increased 
risk-taking lead to the collapse of the subprime market causing a liquidity squeeze, which in turn 
affected the wider financial markets leading to the financial crisis. The market analysis 
demonstrated the collapse of the non-Agency market, but demonstrated the robustness of the 
agency- MBS market during the last two decades. The mean-variance analysis confirmed, that 
agency mortgage backed securities have a significant role in a diversified portfolio. The agency-
MBS and agency- CMOs were persistently overweighed in the computed tangency portfolios. Even 
when altering portfolio compositions, agency MBS and CMO weights remained strong.  
 
Hence, this study found considerable evidence for an important role of agency mortgage backed 
securities in a diversified portfolio, due to excellent diversification benefits and attracter risk/return 
attributes. The analysis could confirm the first research hypothesis, since securitized agency-MBS 
have in fact substantial allocations in the computed tangency portfolio with persistent allocations 
in excess of 70%.  This was explained by the high Sharpe Ratios, as well as the strong 
diversification capabilities of this asset class. In addition to the risk/return attributes, the market 
analysis indicated a stable performance of this asset class during the last two decades class, making 
it a valid addition to a mixed investment portfolio. The second hypothesis could also be confirmed 
since the CMBS and the CMO-Z-tranche index were excluded in most efficient portfolios due to 
inferior risk/ return statistics. The third hypothesis could partly be confirmed as a significant 
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distinction between direct and indirect real estate in the mean-variance framework was discovered. 
REITs, as the highest yielding asset class in this study, have in fact high allocations in the riskiest 
efficient portfolios. However, direct real estate had significantly lower risk and return attributes 
leading to higher allocations in the minimum-variance portfolios. Finally, exceptional 
diversification benefits of securitized agency mortgages in a mixed portfolio in combination with 
direct real estate was discovered. However, the origin of this effect remains unclear and could be 
analyzed in a future study. Investors can make use of this study by considering investments into 
the analyzed asset classes through exchange traded funds (ETFs), which closely track the 
performance of the underlying index. For example, the agency-MBS index analyzed in this study 
is tracked by several large ETFs, like the iShares MBS ETF or the Vanguard Mortgage-Backed 
Securities ETF.  
 
As described in the literature review, the mean-variance optimization framework has substantial 
limitations. Mean- variance optimized portfolios often lack robustness in out of sample 
performance, indicating, that the high Sharpe Ratio achieved over the sample period does not last 
in periods when risk/ return characteristics change. Hence, the results of the mean-variance 
optimization have to be considered carefully. In particular, concrete calculated allocations should 
not be assumed without further analysis. This is especially relevant, since this analysis is based on 
indices representing asset classes. Furthermore, this study ignores transaction costs in the 
conducted computations, which would have to be paid, due to the quarterly rebalancing required 
to maintain the calculated tangency weights. Additionally, specific characteristics of direct real 
estate investments are not considered, in particular the substantial transaction costs due to legal 
fees as well as the tax benefits realizable through depreciation and mortgage write offs. Finally, the 
recently announced balance sheet reductions of the FED may lead to declines in MBS purchases, 
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the absorption capabilities of the MBS market of this circumstance have yet to be assessed. In 
addition to the diversification effects between direct real estate and agency MBS, an analysis of 
non-agency- mortgages in the mean-variance framework would be valuable topics for future 
research. In particular, the analysis of investments into securitized subprime mortgages, would be 
a noteworthy extension of this study for assessing diversified portfolios with a higher risk exposure. 
Additionally, the assessment of international MBS may provide a useful insight into geographic 
diversification effects of securitized mortgages.   
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7. Appendices 
Sent in a separate file: 
Annex 1: Optimization_model_4_assets.xslm 
Annex 2 Optimization_model_10_assets.xslm 
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